

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

TOTAL FORCE: THE RESERVE RECALL PROCESS AND
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

by

Daryce L. Moore

June 1991

Thesis Advisor:
Co-Advisor:

Mark J. Eitelberg
Richard S. Elster

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

T256197

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE				
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) 54	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
		Program Element No	Project No	Task No
				Work Unit Accession Number
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) TOTAL FORCE: THE RESERVE RECALL PROCESS AND DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM				
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Moore, Daryce L.				
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis	13b. TIME COVERED From To	14. DATE OF REPORT (year, month, day) 1991, June	15. PAGE COUNT 91	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUBGROUP	Quality; Contractor Assessment ; APADE	
19. ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Desert Shield/Desert Storm reserve recall process in the context of the past and future of the Total Force Plan. The thesis provides an overview of the evolution of the Total Force Plan since its inception in 1973. It then takes a case analysis approach to describing the events of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm recall. The focus is on the systemic obstacles faced by the implementers of the recall process. Most notably, it finds that the focus of existing plans on mobilization rather than recall, and the incompatibility of the reserve and active personnel information systems complicated the recall process. It further looks at the requirements of horizontal integration and means of engendering a more active partnership between active and reserve components. Finally, it provides recommendations for developing a system of graduated personnel conditions related to contingency planning, in order to enhance the integration of reserve assets when needed.				
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Dr. Mark Eitelberg			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area code) (408) 646-3160	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL Code 54

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

TOTAL FORCE: THE RESERVE RECALL PROCESS AND DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

by

Daryce Lianne Moore
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Illinois State University

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
JUNE 1991

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Desert Shield/Desert Storm reserve recall process in the context of the past and future of the Total Force Plan. The thesis provides an overview of the evolution of the Total Force Plan since its inception in 1973. It then takes a case analysis approach to describing the events of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm recall. The focus is on the systemic obstacles faced by the implementers of the recall process. Most notably, it finds that the focus of existing plans on mobilization rather than recall, and the incompatibility of the reserve and active personnel information systems complicated the recall process. It further looks at the requirements of horizontal integration and means of engendering a more active partnership between active and reserve components. Finally, it provides recommendations for developing a system of graduated personnel conditions related to contingency planning, in order to enhance the integration of reserve assets when needed.

1 RES/3
AN 7615
C.1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	BACKGROUND	1
B.	OBJECTIVES	3
C.	THE RESEARCH QUESTION	4
D.	SCOPE	5
E.	METHODOLOGY	6
F.	DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS	7
G.	ORGANIZATION OF STUDY	10
H.	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	11
II.	BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY	13
A.	BACKGROUND	13
B.	HISTORY OF RESERVE UTILIZATION	14
C.	TOTAL FORCE PLANNING ISSUES	18
1.	Threat Environment	18
2.	Resource Environment	19
a.	Funding	19
b.	Manpower	21
3.	Strategic Environment	24
a.	Evolving Strategic Assumptions	24
b.	Horizontal Integration and Mutual Support	26
D.	METHODOLOGY	29
III.	THE RESERVE CALL-UP	30
A.	THE BEGINNING	30
1.	Chronology of Buildup	30
2.	Composition of the Navy's Total Force	32

3. Procedures for Call-up	33
a. Recall and Validation of Requirements	33
b. Processing Recalled Reservists	37
(1) Mobilization vs. Recall	37
(2) Process Chronology.	40
B. MISSIONS OF NAVY RESERVES EMPLOYED IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM	40
1. Conceptual Strategy of Force Mix	40
2. Reserve Missions and Force Structure Mix	42
C. ISSUES	45
1. Pay and Entitlements	46
2. Deferments	46
3. Administrative and Processing Procedures	48
D. SUMMARY	48
IV. ANALYSIS	49
A. ISSUE ANALYSIS IN CONTEXT	49
1. Pueblo Experience	49
2. Exercise Experience	50
a. Global War Game 89 Results	50
b. Comparison of GWG 89 Experience with Desert Shield/Desert Storm	52
3. Human Cost of Accomplishing the Mission	52
B. RAMIFICATIONS FOR TOTAL FORCE PLANNING	54
1. Threat Environment and Evolving U.S. Strategy	54
2. Resource Environment	55
3. Manpower Requirements	56
4. Training	57
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	59
A. RECALL VS. MOBILIZATION	59

B.	SYSTEMIC SUPPORT	59
C.	HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION	60
D.	RECOMMENDATIONS	60
APPENDIX		63
BIBLIOGRAPHY		79
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		82

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The support of the many people who assisted in providing information about the Desert Shield/Desert Storm recall is gratefully acknowledged. Most of these are the same "unsung heroes" whose dedication and commitment made implementation of the recall possible. They are the staff members of the various command elements whose codes are identified throughout the text of this thesis, and whose interviews are cited in the bibliography.

Very special thanks is offered to Captain (ret) Edward A. Brookes, whose vision of total force needs and possibilities and whose dedication to supporting the "One Navy" concept originally ignited my interest in this vital area and inspired me to undertake this thesis. His continuing support, guidance, assistance, and ideas have been of inestimable value in the completion of this thesis, and are very much appreciated.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Since the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the attention of U.S. citizens and, indeed, of the world has focused on the capability of U.S. fighting forces. The lessening of world tensions and changing circumstances in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during 1989 had resulted in more than a year of euphoria, during which the possibility of armed conflict began to seem increasingly remote. Suddenly, circumstances changed to require the most massive deployment of U.S. forces since the Vietnam conflict ended, this time in cooperation with those of much of the rest of the world. This deployment occurred under a personnel strategy known as the Total Force Plan.

The Department of Defense (DOD) adopted the Total Force Plan in 1973, concurrently with the elimination of conscription. For most of the post-World War II era, the U.S. had relied on conscription as a major component of personnel strategy. Adoption of the All-Volunteer Force represented a major shift in personnel resource strategy. No longer could DOD rely on adjustments in conscription quotas to meet changing personnel requirements. Instead, flexibility and responsiveness would have to come from a combination of the four categories of personnel support which comprise the total force: active duty forces, reserve forces, civilian fulltime employees, and civilian contractor support.

For much of the next two decades, defense personnel requirements were generally met by active forces, civilian employees, and civilian contractors. Reserves played an important role through their contributions during drill and training periods, but either national security requirements did not demand or political conditions did not permit deployment of reserve assets involuntarily or on a large scale.

While mechanisms were developed during this period to allow flexible utilization of reserve assets under varying conditions, such as low-intensity conflict and partial mobilization, skepticism that reservists would be involuntarily activated under other than full mobilization conditions continued to pervade DOD and the service components. Thus, a dichotomy existed. Resource allocation between active and reserve forces led many sophisticated planners to conclude that the employment of reserve assets would be essential under any type of conflict scenario. However, many of these same planners doubted that these assets would be available except voluntarily, due to the political ramifications of involuntary activation.

As of 1 August 1990, the mechanisms for large-scale reserve mobilization under the Total Force Plan had been exercised on a limited basis but never tested under real-world conditions, and many doubted they ever would be. Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and, in one week, everything changed. Defense leadership requested that President Bush use the authority granted him under Title 10 U.S. Code 673b to allow reserve augmentation of regular forces, and he assented. Suddenly, the skepticism of decades had been negated, and the services were faced with implementing, not a mobilization, but a large-scale recall. They faced their first opportunity to dust off the on-the-shelf-plans and test them under real-world, high-threat conditions.

There is no question that the services were able to respond to this challenge: reservists were quickly deployed and participated actively in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.¹ To that degree, the test was met successfully. However, a more detailed examination is in order to determine how the test was met, what processes had to be changed, what problems had to be solved, and how the existing systems can be changed

¹Future references will be to Desert Shield, the combat portion, Desert Storm, or the entire operation as Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

to better facilitate the process if/when it is exercised in the future. That is the focus of this thesis.

B. OBJECTIVES

The objective of this thesis is to examine the implementation of reserve augmentation during Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the context of the Total Force Concept and from the viewpoint of the manpower analyst. Specifically, the operation provided a unique opportunity to learn more about the operation of the Total Force Concept and identify areas of current and future concern for integration of the reserve forces. For the first time since the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973, this deployment depended, in large measure, on calling up reserve forces to augment standing (active duty) forces. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm represents the first time that any President has used his authority under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b to call up to 200,000 reservists for two successive 90-day periods whenever he determines they are needed. This 673b authority was changed to two successive 180-day periods for the duration of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, fiscal 1991 only. As the first operational test of the Total Force Policy, this situation provides a unique opportunity to study the efficacy of this approach in meeting national security objectives and the workability of current systems and procedures, as well as to identify changes that may be needed in order to enhance the successful implementation of the policy.

The experiences with recall of reserve personnel for Desert Shield/Desert Storm have far-reaching ramifications. These include definition of optimal active/reserve force structure mix; alignment of active and reserve manpower information systems; peacetime role of reserve forces; response time under various recall and mobilization conditions; impact of reserve integration on future operational planning; pay issues and their impact on the cost of the total force;

Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) responsiveness to different contingency requirements; Selected Reserve (SELRES)/gaining command interaction in training certification; and development of procedures for validation of reserve manpower requirements.

A significant element in the reserve recall implementation was the difference in systemic and support requirements between implementing a recall and mobilizing. The support systems and focus of operational planning have tremendous impact on the accomplishment of the task itself. The experiences of Desert Shield/Desert Storm offer an unparalleled opportunity to hone future plans and guide future actions based on real and recent operational experience. If the Total Force Policy is to remain the underlying manpower strategy for force mix--and the success of the Persian Gulf War certainly indicates that it will--every opportunity to learn from past successes and mistakes must be exploited to the maximum extent possible.

The gains from this are obvious. The goal of the Total Force Policy is to achieve an optimal balance between standing and augmentation forces. An optimal balance is one which allows achievement of national security objectives while minimizing associated costs. Incorrect decisions are costly, both in terms of dollars and the impact they may have on achievement of operational missions. One of the collateral benefits of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that it provides an opportunity which surpasses that of any mobilization exercise to assess both plans and procedures and to make the necessary adjustments.

C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary research question guiding this study is, "How did the reserve augmentation process work during Desert Shield/Desert Storm?" Subsidiary considerations addressed in support of the main goal include the following:

- Description of the chronological evolution of reserve augmentation for this operation
- Identification of key staff elements and their responsibilities during this process
- Comparison of the actual process to pre-existing perceptions and plans for accomplishing reserve augmentation
- Examination of how current systems aided or impeded the augmentation process
- Identification of future directions and follow-on questions resulting from lessons learned during Desert Shield/Desert Storm and their implications for reserve planning and utilization as part of the total force

D. SCOPE

This thesis is a case study of the reserve recall process in the U.S. Navy from the viewpoint of the staff participants in the Washington D.C. arena, i.e. Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), and the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). It focuses on the "macro" questions of implementation and policy faced by manpower personnel planners and analysts at these levels. While the "micro" questions and problems faced at the field level have major implications for the future of the total force plan, they are included in this study only as perceived, identified, and affecting the actions of the first echelon staff.

There are several reasons for this limitation. First and foremost, it is primarily as the micro questions are filtered up the chain of command that they will have an impact on future plans and strategy involving the Total Force Plan. Second, the scope of data-gathering at the micro level at this time would simply be overwhelming and would preclude completion of the study under the time constraints identified. Finally, focus at the first echelon of command allows better access to the underlying reasons for various problems or decisions than does a field-level focus.

Another limitation on the scope of this study lies in the fact that it takes the viewpoint of those focusing on the manpower/personnel

planning and processing functions. The strategic and tactical objectives which dictate the manpower demands would be a separate and very interesting study. This study focuses on such areas as validation of personnel requirements, policies related to personnel reporting, tracking and transferring of personnel data, pay questions, and related questions. Finally, and reluctantly, this study focuses primarily on the build-up phase of the operation, not the drawdown.² This is unfortunate, since one of the more interesting and demanding phases of the operation will be its conclusion. While plans existed for the build-up phase, there were few, if any, guidelines for what occurs when the crisis is over. Therefore, this is a fruitful area for research. However, this phase has not yet been concluded; indeed, it has barely begun. Therefore, the availability of data and the emergent nature of the case at this time make it impossible to do more than begin to describe the process and its challenges.

E. METHODOLOGY

This case study is based on two types of data: interview data and examination of internal documents of implementation, such as decision papers, memoranda, instructions, and letters. This type of data is used for two reasons: First, it is the most immediate type of data available for a situation which still in process. Second, it is particularly well-suited to the case study approach, which depends, in large part on describing both chronology and perceptions.

Analysis of the case study data is in the context of what the process reveals about the management of personnel strategy and systems. For example, in retrospect it is possible to identify what the key staff players knew that they knew about the implementation process at the

² The term drawdown will be used in place of the more commonly-used term "demobilization" in the interests of accuracy. Since what occurred was a recall, and not a mobilization, and since this difference has major personnel implications, the phase in which reservists are de-activated is not, formally, a demobilization.

outset, what they thought they knew, what they knew without realizing it, what they knew they didn't know, and what their blindspots were. Identification of further information for future process planning allows it to be incorporated into the database of future planners. The broad context for analysis remains, as it always does in military planning issues, the impact on mission readiness and force responsiveness. In view of current efforts to incorporate Total Quality Leadership as the guiding principle for Navy management, this analysis focuses on the continuing process of improvement of existing systems, rather than on a "right/wrong" or Gilbrethian "one best way to do work" approach.

It is important to note that the reserve augmentation process for this operational contingency was one of involuntary recall, rather than mobilization. This fact provided many of the challenges to implementers throughout the duration of the operation. Despite the existence of 673b authority, the implicit focus of both plans and systems for reserve augmentation was mobilization. Consequently, much of what was done in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm involved re-thinking and reinterpreting standing operating procedures. A further complication was provided by the fact that personnel information systems used by reserve and active forces were incompatible. Analysis of the events of the first six months of this operation shows that these two factors were, in fact, driving forces behind much of what happened.

F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

In the interests of clarity and simplicity, some commonly used terms and acronyms are defined at the outset. These include the following:

Total Force - The Navy's total force is composed of four elements: Active Duty, Selected Reserve, Pretrained Individual Manpower and Civilian.³

Selected Reserve (SELRES) - Those reservists in a drill pay status, trained and equipped for war, who are available on a part-time, voluntary basis during peacetime (unless recalled under appropriate statute). They represent the difference between the manpower the nation can afford to maintain during peacetime (Active Duty) and the trained manpower required at the start of a conventional war.

Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM) - These are manpower resources which are available only at mobilization, composed of the following three groups:

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) - These are reservists who have incurred a military obligation but are not in a drill pay status.

Standby Reserve - These are individuals who maintain their military affiliation by choice and have skills which will be needed at mobilization, or reservists who have been designated as key federal employees. These reservists are not in a drill status.

Retired/Fleet Reserve - Individuals in this category have retired from either active duty or the Naval Reserve. This category may include personnel over the age of 60 and/or disabled personnel, who will be called during mobilization on an "as needed" basis only.⁴

³In the early days of the Total Force Concept, a fifth element was included, that of allied nations. As the Total Force Concept evolved into the Total Force Policy it was recognized that U.S. planning required a Total Force which was subject to U.S. control. Thus, while the importance of allied burden-sharing is still a vital issue, the elements of the Total Force, for our purposes, do not include allied support.

⁴A Report on the Navy's Total Force FY 91, DON, 1991, p.3.

Ship Manpower Document (SMD), Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) and Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) - These programs use studies and analyses to establish the quantity and quality of personnel needed to operate the Navy's units in a wartime environment (peacetime for SHMD).⁵

Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS) - System operated by OP-01 which consolidates inputs from resource sponsors and manpower claimants to establish billet structuring.

Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) - This system, brought on-line in 1983, sets mobilization requirements using data from SHMD, SMD, and SQMD. NAMMOS is expected to provide credible, justifiable requirements consistent with the need for readiness and minimal cost. As Kostiuk explains:

NAMMOS is based on the idea that a particular warfighting scenario requires a set of functions to be performed. These functions, in turn, imply workloads that determine the quantity of manpower needed to execute the workloads. The methodology uses information on the relationships between peacetime manpower and workloads to extrapolate the change in workload upon mobilization and the resulting change in manpower requirements. Some functions may not be expanded immediately or the workloads may change at varying rates, so that the manpower requirements generated are time-phased by both quantity and quality. Although the estimates generated will be necessarily scenario-dependent, the process can be adjusted to reflect different wartime environments if desired.⁶

Reserve Training Support System (Technical Enhancement) (RTSS (TE)) - Automated personnel system used by Commander Naval Reserve Forces (COMNAVRESFOR) echelons two through four for tracking personnel information on reservists.

Source Data System (SDS) - Automated personnel system used for tracking active duty service members.

⁵Kostiuk, Peter F., The Navy Manpower-Requirements System, CNA Research Memorandum 87-114, p. 4.

⁶Kostiuk, p. 5-6.

Gain to Active Duty - Move a reservist to active duty by completing a prescribed set of actions.

G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows:

Chapter II: **BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY**

This chapter presents a brief history of the reserve program and its role under the total force concept. It focuses on the status of the reserve program prior to the recent operation, force structure available, and strategic planning issues identified as they relate to the reserve program. Finally, it reviews the process used for development of the data to be presented.

Chapter III: **PRESENTATION OF THE CASE**

This chapter describes what occurred, areas of responsibility, problems encountered, and where the process is leading. Included in this area are the development of manpower requirements and the identification of personnel issues, as well as the context in which events occurred.

Chapter IV: **ANALYSIS/INTERPRETATION**

This chapter looks at the issues identified in the case and analyzes their implications in light of strategic processes, readiness, and management effectiveness. Comparison of the assumptions of pre-existing strategy with experience will lead toward identification of future issues of concern to the Navy's total force plans.

Chapter V: **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter integrates the data and analysis presented and offers several conclusions and recommendations for future policy, strategy, and study.

H. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The Desert Shield build-up was evolutionary and incremental. It represented the first test of the authority granted under Title 10 U.S. Code, section 673(b) to call up to 200,000 SELRES for operational reasons. Though President Bush later declared a national emergency and broadened the augmentation under section 673 mobilization authority on January 18, 1991, the build-up itself was conducted under 673b authority, colloquially known as "200K" (or 200,000) authority. The difference between requirements for recall and mobilization was insufficiently recognized under most pre-existing plans, which emphasized what would be done under general mobilization conditions. There was a lack of flexible, tailored operational and personnel plans, which meant that most of the recall had to be accomplished by people writing new plans and programs as situations arose.

Although units could be and were recalled as units, the smaller numbers authorized under 673(b) and the specific requirements of this conflict led to a more individualized recall process. The difference meant that each individual Navy reservist recalled had to be separately detached from the reserves and gained to active duty, a process involving a myriad of separate tasks. This created backlogs, delays, and vast potential for error.

Billets previously identified and validated under NAMMOS did not provide sufficient guidance during the contingency. It was found that theater commander requirements often identified needs in areas where the NAMMOS system had no previously-identified requirement. Cross-assignment occurred frequently, which has long-range implications for planning and training.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm confounded the experts who thought reserve assets would be used only on an "all-or-nothing" basis. Now the planning and systemic support must catch up with the legislative

authority to use the Navy reserve, bringing about "One Navy" in fact as well as in concept.

II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY

A. BACKGROUND

After abandoning conscription and adopting an all-volunteer-force in 1973, DOD reorganized its forces around a cost-saving concept called the Total Force Policy. This policy resulted from review of the experiences of both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. There are two underlying premises of the Total Force Policy: 1) Reserve forces are the primary augmentation element for the active force; and 2) The total force relies on integrated use of all available forces, including active, reserve, retired, civilian, and allied.⁷

The Total Force Policy has evolved and changed as national security objectives have altered and a cohesive U.S. maritime strategy has emerged. The concerns were initially directed toward reducing reserve personnel, based on the new strategy of a quick, decisive military campaign. During the next sixteen years, improved technology and the continuing Soviet military build up would prove that the U.S. still needed to be prepared for a protracted, conventional war, with large ground troop mobilization.⁸ This evolved into a strategy of partnership among all elements of the total force. All too frequently, only military personnel, active and reserve, are considered when the term "total force" is used. In fact, much of the military force structure is comprised of civilian employees in administrative, technical, professional and specialized capacities. In the Navy alone, civilian personnel are projected to comprise 19 percent of the total Naval force

⁷Total Force Policy Report to Congress, DOD, Dec 1990.

⁸Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, DOD, Fiscal Year 1988, p. 89.

as of the end of fiscal 1991.⁹ Across DOD, approximately 16 percent of the total force is composed of civilians.¹⁰ Although the focus of this thesis is the reserve element, all components of the total force are interrelated and must be considered when alternatives are considered.

Both reserve components and civilians are integrated into many theater operational plans. Since the Total Force Policy was implemented, the reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness.¹¹

B. HISTORY OF RESERVE UTILIZATION

The use of reserve forces as part of warfighting strategy dates back to the time of Prince Machiavelli. The earliest concepts of reserve utilization differ little from those to which we subscribe today. Originally, citizens "drilled" (underwent military training) on holidays in their hometowns. The basic purposes behind the use of "citizen soldiers" parallel those prevalent today: increase the number of trained personnel available for defense without the expense of maintaining a large, standing military force; spread the burden of defense throughout the citizenry; avoid separation between military and civilian members of society which comes from a two-class (professional military and civilian) system; and minimize the potential for corruption or expedience which comes from extensive use of mercenaries.¹²

United States defense objectives have never relied, for their attainment, exclusively on a standing, professional military force. As

⁹A Report on the Navy's Total Force FY 91, Department of the Navy, 1991, p. 3.

¹⁰Total Force Policy Report, p. 23.

¹¹Guthrie, RADM Wallace N., Jr., Baumgardner, Captain Hugh, and Chaloupka, CDR Mel, "The Reserve Is Ready and Waiting," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, Sep 1990, p. 46.

¹²Gilbert, Felix, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton University Press, 1986.

noted in the 1990 Total Force Policy Report to Congress, "America has always depended upon reserve forces and our mobilization base to maintain, in peacetime, capabilities that would be required in war." General George C. Marshall pointed this out at the close of World War

II:

What then must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt ourselves on Military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively expensive professional Army even if one could be recruited? President Washington answered that question in recommendations to the first Congress to convene under the United States Constitution. He proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen Army.¹³

Reserve forces have been recognized equally as essential to the nation's seapower. In 1968, prior to the advent of the Total Force Plan, former CNO, Admiral Thomas Moorer, stated:

For nearly two hundred years, since the days of the naval militias of the Revolutionary War, the citizen sailors of our Naval Reserve have been an essential element in our nation's seapower and military preparedness.

The history of the Naval Reserve is one of brave men and women whose skills, dedication and hard work over the years have enabled our Navy and our American way of life to be what they are today. The Navy's tradition of victory is a heritage of which our countrymen are justifiably proud--and one which Naval Reservists have helped to make a reality.

The challenges which this nation faces at sea in the years to come indicate the continued need for the most effective naval and maritime capability. The officers and men of the United States Naval Reserve have a significant role in contributing to the overall strength of that capability.¹⁴

Beginning with the eruption of World War I (WWI), a series of legislation, starting with the National Defense Act of 1916, created a

¹³ As quoted in the statement by Edward Philbin, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 20 March 1984, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1985, Senate Armed Services Committee, Part 5, Manpower and Personnel, p. 2468, found in Cronin, Patrick M., The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 87-78, Jun 1987.

¹⁴ Simpson, Terry L. and Ingle, Brenda D., A Financial Management Review of the Naval Reserve Manpower Allowance and Training Requirements, NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 18.

dual-purpose, federal-state status for the National Guard, and placed both an Officers and Enlisted Reserve Corps wholly under federal control. The Naval and Marine Corps Reserve were also created in that same year. After WWI, the National Defense Act of 1920 was passed to provide for an organized reserve system with acceptable military standards. Elaborate mobilization plans replaced trained and available manpower between the wars. Between 1920 and 1940, reservists outnumbered active duty personnel.

Prior to World War II (WWII), a Joint Resolution of Congress enacted the Selective Service Act in 1940. By June 1942, all reserve units were mobilized to the Pacific theater. America prevailed, though more because of its economic and industrial strength and the perseverance of her allies than because of foresight or military preparedness. In 1947 the National Security Act established the Air Force as an independent service and created the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.

Between WWII and Korea, reserve units had many veterans but little money, equipment, or training. The resurrection of conscription in 1948 brought a flow of lower-ranking manpower into reserve units. The Korean War began with 806,000 reservists activated (32 percent of 2.5 million). The Armed Forces Act of 1952 created a system of ready, stand-by reserves. The single most significant action affecting reservists was the 1957 regulation requiring a minimum active duty training phase for every reservist. This meant that every recruit would be certified at a minimum standard by active duty personnel before being released to his base unit.¹⁵

Apart from those conflicts already described, U.S. reservists have seen service during a variety of international crises and some domestic emergencies. These include, among others: the Berlin crisis (1961),

¹⁵Zuricher, Louis A., Supplementary Military Forces: Reserves, Militias, Auxiliaries, Sage, 1978, p. 37.

the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the Pueblo affair (1968), the Vietnam conflict (1968), the New York City area postal strike (1970), over 260 civil disturbances, escort operations in the Arabian Gulf (Operation Earnest Will, 1987) and the invasion of Panama (Operation Just Cause, 1989-1990). Not all of these actions have involved involuntary recalls, but all have relied for their success on participation of reserve personnel.¹⁶

In 1970, the Total Force Concept was created by Defense Secretary (SECDEF) Melvin Laird to make the reserves a more credible part of the deterrent force. During the Nixon administration, the selected reserve end-strength for all services fell from 925,000 in fiscal 1972 to 823,000 in fiscal 1976, an overall decline of 10 percent. The rationale for cutting the reserves was linked to the then-new strategy of a quick, decisive military campaign, rather than a long war like WWII. U.S. military officials were pushing for a short, intensive, possibly nuclear scenario, which precluded the need for large reserve mobilization. It took at least five more years before the U.S. began to discuss a new wartime strategy that was based on the ability to fight a protracted, conventional war.

The 1980s were a decade of increasing emphasis on reserve assets. The mid-1980s saw reserve requirements increase steadily, and the reduction of inequities and inequalities between the active and reserve force equipment, hardware, and training.¹⁷ Between 1980 and 1990, Navy SELRES end-strength increased by over 50 percent, while active duty end-strength grew only 15 percent during the same period. Weaponry placed in the Naval Reserve included the F/A-18, modern frigates, P-3 Update III, and HH-60H helicopters.¹⁸

¹⁶Total Force Policy Report, p. 13-19.

¹⁷Cronin, op cit., 1987, p. 12.

¹⁸Navy's Total Force Fy 91, p. 4.

C. TOTAL FORCE PLANNING ISSUES

The major factor which must be considered in determining the size and composition of the total force is national security objectives. In this area, several types of issues must be considered: threat environment, resource environment, and military strategic needs.

1. Threat Environment

The dramatic changes which have occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since 1989 have important ramifications for U.S. national security objectives. The current conditions in the Soviet Union are far too chaotic for the U.S. to assume the success of the Gorbachev reforms is assured. In fact, recent events have shown some degree of movement back toward more repressive and restrictive policies. However, the changes which have already occurred have influenced the degree of capability which the Soviet Union has of projecting force in a conventional manner. The demise of the Warsaw Pact, while no guarantee that the Soviet threat has ended, certainly lengthens the amount of warning time the U.S. can assume before being forced to meet the Soviet Union in a full-scale war.¹⁹

These changes led to increased scrutiny of the total force mix and increased potential to place more forces in the reserve components, in order to achieve cost savings while continuing to meet national security objectives. As noted by the DOD Task Force on the Total Force Plan, "A basic consideration in force structure decisions is the time assumed between mobilization and combat: the longer the warning time, the lower the required level of peacetime readiness."²⁰

¹⁹Cheney, Richard Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, Jan 1991.

²⁰Total Force Policy Report, p. 3.

Lessening of the Soviet threat does not mean a threat-free environment. In fact, the worldwide threat level remains high.²¹ However, the type of crisis which the U.S. is most likely to face has changed: the focus is now on regional conflicts and low-intensity conflict. These may erupt with little warning. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to maintain rapid response capability, though the forces in being may be smaller, due to changes in requirements as well as the changing resource environment.²²

2. Resource Environment

There are two main issues to be considered in the context of the resource environment: funding and manpower.

a. Funding

The U.S. faces growing social needs, a large budget deficit, and growing economic concerns. In real terms, the U.S. defense budget has continually declined over the past five years, and it appears likely that cost issues will remain important influences on force structure decisions in the next decade.²³ In fact, it is the resource environment which forms the driving pressure for increased reliance on the reserve components. Former Director and Chief of the Naval Reserve, Rear Admiral Palmer, pointed out in 1980:

Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, defense policy makers have embraced a Total Force policy chiefly designed to shift missions and hardware from the active forces to reserve components. Rooted more in domestic considerations than in strategic concepts, the principal impetus of this policy has been to maintain affordable armed forces based on inducement rather than induction."²⁴

²¹Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³Ibid., p. 58.

²⁴Statement by RADM F.F. Palmer, Director and Chief of the Naval Reserve, 17 Jun 1980, "Hearings Before the House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, FY 1981, Part 10, p. 207, in Lacy, James L., "Whither the All-Volunteer Force?" Yale Law and Policy Review, (Fall 1986).

In light of these concerns, it is important to note what past studies have revealed about relative costs of reserve and active components. Many of the savings associated with assignment of missions to the reserves flow from the fact that the reserves use pretrained individuals; thus, training costs and learning curves are minimized. As Rishel noted:

The fact that most SELRES are veterans will be a significant factor affecting the indirect costs of reservists as opposed to those of active personnel...When large training investments are recoverable through reserve service, the cost savings increase dramatically."²⁵

Cost savings achieved by transfer of missions or units to the reserves differ by type of requirements. It has been demonstrated in the past that Naval Reserve patrol (P-3) squadrons cost about 44 percent of what it costs to operate an active P-3 squadron, while Naval Reserve carrier air wings cost about half as much as their active counterparts.²⁶

Prior to announcement of the current DOD reduction in projected end-strengths, some concern had surfaced about the future composition of the Naval Reserve, in terms of non-prior-service personnel. Early reports had indicated that the Naval Reserve of the 1990s might need to be manned by SAM and O-SAM personnel to a level of 50 percent. Since increased use of SAM and O-SAM personnel is associated with escalating training and replacement costs, the actual ability to achieve cost savings by transferring missions to the reserves was in doubt.²⁷

If the Navy, in reducing its size, is able to encourage a high Naval Reserve affiliation rate, these concerns may be moot.

²⁵Rishel, Michael Paul, A Cost Comparison of Aviation Personnel: Active vs. Reserve, NPS Thesis, Dec 1985, p. 11.

²⁶Total Force Policy Report, p. 27.

²⁷Ibid., p. 45.

However, questions of relative cost continue to dominate force mix decisions, along with the tradeoffs they engender between cost and readiness. Leary pointed out in 1987, "The constraints of the monies available for defense require the United States to maximize the use of military personnel resources, both active and reserve. As a result, the active and reserve components of the military services must now compete for these scarce dollars."²⁸

b. Manpower

The diminishing size of the youth population available for military service during the 1990s has been of major concern to service manpower analysts for the past decade, and continues to be an issue. While anticipated decreases in the size of the active forces may ease the pressure, they by no means eliminate the concern. Competition with the private sector for the services of the most able members of the youth population is a fact of life. The Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, released in December 1990, recognized this issue and indicated that it might place additional emphasis on non-active portions of the total force, such as civilians and reservists. However, the impact of the Desert Shield call-up on reserve affiliation and continuation rates has yet to be measured, and may be affected by the actual conditions of the call-up and the implementation process itself.

One of the major manpower issues identified with reserve force mix and utilization decisions is that of availability. Despite the enunciation of the Total Force Policy, much of DOD leadership, and Navy leadership in particular, remained doubtful about the availability of reserve assets under conditions short of general war. Prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, few believed that a reserve augmentation under 673(b) was likely. Navy decisions about force structure mix were admittedly influenced by a Concern about "limited availability of

²⁸Leary, Guy B., An Analysis of the United States Naval Reserve Budget Growth, NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 6.

Selected Reserve personnel" and "reluctance to initiate a reserve call-up."²⁹

These concerns were further identified in a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Research Memorandum on the Total Force Policy in 1987:

The Total Force policy has marked a fundamental shift in the composition of the armed forces because of the degree to which the reserves have been emphasized. In short, it is increasingly evident that there is a correlation between force manning and readiness. The balance between active and reserve forces cannot indefinitely continue to shift toward the reserves without affecting the ability of the United States to respond swiftly and with sufficient military force to crises and wars. Furthermore, it is not clear that Congressional and Defense Department leaders have fully considered the political and psychological implications of having to mobilize the reserves for any large-scale contingency, or whether the United States can count on having sufficient time to mobilize its reserves for general war.³⁰

As a result of these concerns, the Navy looked on its reserve assets as representing the difference between the active forces the country could afford to sustain during peacetime and the trained forces that would be needed at the outset of a conventional war.³¹ The Navy had no plans to use reservists for short-term contingency operations.³² During the 1987 escort operation in the Persian Gulf, the Navy did not request an involuntary call-up of Naval Reserve personnel assigned to minesweepers, despite the fact that minesweeping capability was needed and nearly all of the minesweepers were maintained in the Naval Reserve. Instead, the ships were manned with a combination of cross-decked active duty personnel and Naval Reserve volunteers.

In contrast, Army planning calls for substantial reserve augmentation for all major contingency operations. The DOD Total Force

²⁹quoted in Total Force Policy Report, p. 50.

³⁰Cronin, p. 2.

³¹Navy's Total Force FY 91, p. 3.

³²Total Force Policy Report, p. 49.

Report asserted, "Since the late 1960s, Army force planners typically have assumed that one-half of the nondivisional elements (i.e., combat, combat support, and combat service support units) that normally support an Army division, or about 12,500 to 15,000 personnel would be needed to sustain that division during the first 60 days of a deployment. Accordingly, in 1968 the Secretary of Defense directed that at least 50 percent of each division's nondivisional support elements should be able to deploy immediately with the division."³³

These differences in reserve orientation may find their explanation in the number and type of deployments each service was accustomed to completing. The Navy, as a mobile, generally forward deployed force, was accustomed to being the "service of choice" in a crisis or contingency situation, and to responding with little or no warning time. The 1991 report on the Navy's Total Force summarized, "Since 1980, naval forces have been called to action no fewer than 50 times when our interests have been threatened overseas - in Lebanon, Libya, the Persian Gulf, Korea, the Philippines, and in Panama, for example."³⁴ The Navy's mission in peacetime is substantially closer to its role in wartime than that of any of the other services. Consequently, it has been the most reluctant of the services to separate any of its missions from the active component.

Nevertheless, Navy force structure decisions of the last decade have moved substantial mission capability to the reserve component. Actual percentages of mission capability which reside in the reserve component are discussed in chapter Three.

Committing missions and resources to the Naval Reserve was done under the guiding principles already enumerated, namely that the Navy would maintain, in its active component, the capability to respond

³³Ibid., p. 48.

³⁴Navy's Total Force FY 91, p. 2.

to short-term contingencies. Skepticism about the availability of reserve assets under other than mobilization conditions resulted in plans which focused on using reserves only under those conditions. There was a dearth of planning for a reserve recall; all personnel planning documents and personnel information systems were mobilization oriented.³⁵

3. Strategic Environment

Manpower decisions for the total force are directly related to the strategic environment; in the Navy, they flow from the Maritime Strategy. The Maritime Strategy is based on forward presence. Its purpose is to use early global positioning of maritime assets to promote deterrence and to achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails. It emphasizes forward deployment to complicate a potential adversary's planning, bolster our alliances, and deny an adversary free access to the oceans, while maintaining and protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) essential to attainment of U.S. national security objectives.³⁶

a. *Evolving Strategic Assumptions*

The Maritime Strategy reflects current thinking in terms of national strategy. On August 2, 1990, President Bush described the evolving defense strategy and enumerated its four basic tenets: "Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests--the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity to

³⁵COMNAVRESFOR P3060.1B, Guide for the Mobilization of the Selected Reserve.

³⁶Navy's Total Force FY 91, p. 12.

rebuild our forces should this be needed and to maintain an effective deterrent."³⁷

The Secretary of Defense clarified this evolving strategy on September 6, 1990:

We still depend very much upon forward deployments in Asia and the Pacific, a historic relationship with our friends in Japan and Korea, and the deployment of forces in that part of the world, but at lower levels. It would, obviously, continue to involve significant U.S. deployments in Europe, but again, at significantly lower levels as embodies in the CFE talks and reflective of the fundamental changes under way there as well. Finally, it would involve here at home, in the United States, the development of the kinds of contingency forces that would allow us to back up our strategic capability. So that concept of an Atlantic force and a Pacific force, contingency forces based in the United States, and strategic forces becomes the driver, if you will, of our force structure in the years ahead. And most importantly, in terms of sizing our active force and our reserve forces, would be to maintain those forward deployments and to be able to reinforce in the event of a contingency on a regional basis, keeping in mind the notion that if we ever did have to reconstitute forces to be prepared for global conflict, that we would have adequate warning time to do that.³⁸

The major changes represented in traditional DOD thinking by these statements are the assumption of a longer warning time to reconstitute forces, before a protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union would be possible, and the focus on regional conflict instead of the Soviet Union as the primary threat. This orientation has implications for decision regarding force structure and force mix.

The traditional concerns about the mix of active and reserve forces and the impact of the mix were enumerated by former CNO, Admiral James Watkins in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense in 1987:

The Navy's total manpower needs result directly from requirements of the maritime strategy....We have moved forward aggressively to integrate and maximize reserve contributions while ensuring that no missions are transferred to the reserves which either result in a degradation of readiness, cannot be supported by available reserve manpower, or are costlier than leaving them with the active forces.

³⁷Cheney, DOD Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1991, p. 1.

³⁸Total Force Policy Report, p. 59.

The focus of this process is "horizontal integration." Front-line ships and aircraft now compose a high percentage of the reserve inventory....

But there are limits on our reliance on the Naval Reserve which relate to availability during periods of crisis....The President's 200,000 call-up authority is insufficient to provide the Navy the requisite augmentation in both size and type during a period short of war. Because of this, reserve integration becomes more difficult and must be approached with caution to ensure readiness to meet reasonably foreseeable requirements is maintained.³⁹

These statements reinforce the point made earlier: Navy force mix decisions have been heavily influenced by skepticism about the availability of those assets to support the Maritime Strategy in periods short of general war. This skepticism may be overcome by the events surrounding Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This would allow the Navy to make force mix decisions and training decisions based on a different set of assumptions, thus focusing more on preparation for a variety of different scenarios.

b. Horizontal Integration and Mutual Support

The Total Force Policy has evolved, since its inception, as a result of changes in strategic thinking and resource environment. Originally, the reserves were thought of exclusively as an augmentation force, a force-in-reserve; today the reserves have come to be thought of as a force-in-being. As Cronin observes:

Contrary to the original Total Force concept, which emphasized that the role of the reserves was as a primary augmentation force for active units, the Total Force policy gradually has evolved into supporting reserve forces for first-line active missions. While it is debatable whether or not this is desirable from a strategic perspective, it is clearly different from what the founders of Total Force policy intended. Both Secretaries Laird and Schlesinger stressed in their key memoranda the augmentation role of the reserves. Today, however, the reserves frequently are referred to not as a force in reserve but rather as a force in being. The problem, however, is that the reserves by their very nature cannot be forces-in-being. They must be mobilized, which in turn requires two critical components of any nation's ability to wage war: time and political will. Thus, because such an evolution implies a much greater role for the reserves in active

³⁹Leary, Guy B., An Analysis of the United States Naval Reserve Budget Growth, NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 6.

missions from the start of a major national emergency, a larger reserve forces poses some tough new questions for U.S. strategy.⁴⁰

If the reserves are to be a force-in-being, their training and their peacetime role must be examined closely, particularly in the context of the relationship between active and reserve components. In conflict, active and reserve forces operate together. Many feel that preparation for interoperability can only come from horizontal integration of the reserve and active forces during peacetime. The meaning of horizontal integration was defined by former SECNAV John Lehman in a posture statement in 1986:

Four years ago the Department of the Navy undertook a major reorganization of reserve components to move from a vertical to a horizontal relationship with the active forces. That means essentially that the reserves must provide immediate augmentation to the active force in time of emergency across the entire spectrum of warfare. It means also that, in peacetime, we rely on Selected Reserves to provide real-time fleet support across their mission areas.⁴¹

Despite Cronin's reservations, as noted above, about the advisability of horizontal integration, most experts see a direct relationship between horizontal integration, training, and readiness. For example, as Simpson and Ingle pointed out in 1987:

One major function of the Naval Reserve in peacetime is to man, equip and train for a high state of readiness upon mobilization. In training to fill this requirement and ensure effective integration upon mobilization, the Naval Reserve provides active forces with direct support which is mutually beneficial to Selected Reserve mobilization and training requirements. The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions which also provide direct assistance to active duty units in the performance of their missions. Examples are air logistics support for the continental U.S. (CONUS), air tanker services, predeployment air combat refresher training, fleet intelligence production, fleet exercise support, ship intermediate level maintenance, cargo handling support, construction support, chaplain and medical support, and security group signal analysis.⁴²

⁴⁰Cronin, p. 66-67.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 45.

⁴²Simpson and Ingle, p. 1-2.

The question of the degree of readiness which must be required of the reserves has generated controversy. Some feel that reserve readiness must be the same as for the active forces. This position was spelled out by B. J. Wilson III in 1985.

The necessity of the military to respond to developing crises necessitates that reserve forces be trained and maintained at the same combat readiness as the active duty forces they will augment. As a result, the reserves must be integrated as fully as possible in peacetime with the units they will augment in wartime. Any delay in the integration will have a negative effect on the defense capabilities of the United States."⁴³

As the threat environment has changed, and strategy has evolved in response, thoughts on reserve readiness have also evolved. The 1990 Total Force Policy Report points out that readiness need not be consistent for all units, since not all units need the capability to deploy immediately. Because a range of warning times exists, depending on the nature of the need--short for contingencies such as Desert Shield, longer for large-scale conflicts--a range of readiness levels may also be possible.⁴⁴ Despite this evolution, the conclusion remains the same: increased integration between active and reserve units is essential.

This integration is expected to rely in large measure on the vigorous participation of active components in training their associated reserve units. The 1990 Total Force Policy Report continued, "While administration of the active and reserve components differs markedly, the technical requirements of the mission to be fulfilled are essentially the same. The program sponsor is, therefore, in the best position to plan for the reserve force which will be within his

⁴³Wilson, B. J. III, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, United States Government Printing Office, May 1985, in Leary, Guy B., An Analysis of the United States Naval Reserve Budget Growth, NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 26-27.

⁴⁴Total Force Policy Report, p. 50.

management area when activated, to provide them with necessary equipment, and to evaluate their readiness."

The Total Force Policy Report recommended four actions to increase integration: active-reserve rotations; increased reliance on hybrid units containing a mix of active and reserve personnel; strengthened active-reserve affiliations between units which would operate together in wartime; and increased emphasis on attracting prior-service personnel in the reserve components.

One area of integration which the Task Force did not address is that of systemic compatibility. The Navy, for example, has totally different personnel information systems its for active and reserve components, based on peacetime requirements.⁴⁵ While these systems serve their respective components well during peacetime, they do not facilitate integration during a recall or mobilization.⁴⁶ These issues of integration are further examined through the actual occurrences of the Desert Shield reserve recall.

D. METHODOLOGY

The methodology for conducting this research relied on extensive interviews with staff personnel involved in implementing and documenting the Desert Shield/Desert Storm reserve augmentation process. In addition, staff-generated documents were analyzed to identify the actual occurrences and problem areas. The data thus generated were then compared to pre-existing documentation described in this chapter, in an attempt to determine points of similarity and difference. Both interviews and documents used in conducting this analysis are identified in the bibliography.

⁴⁵Hall, Final Report of the Total Force Utilization Study, CNA, PML Research Memo 87-82, Jul 1987.

⁴⁶Matt, CAPT Michael, OP-130R, interview, March 14, 1991.

III. THE RESERVE CALL-UP

A. THE BEGINNING

The actual start of Operation Desert Shield coincided with the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's forces on 2 August 1990. The President immediately ordered U.S. military forces into Saudi Arabia and initiated a naval blockade of Iraq to counter the threat of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. Soon the U.S. action was joined by other nations and ultimately backed up by a United Nations resolution calling for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Reserve participation began on 22 August, when President Bush exercised the authority given the President under Title 10 U.S. Code, section 673b. Thus began the first application of the total force policy under actual operational conditions.

In order to understand the reserve augmentation process for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it is helpful to first provide an overview of the milestones of the reserve call-up process. Therefore, a chronological overview of milestones is provided:

1. Chronology of Buildup⁴⁷

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
Aug 2	Iraq invades and occupies Kuwait with more than 100,000 troops.
Aug 7	President Bush declares Saudi Arabia under imminent threat from Iraq and order U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia.
Aug 7	U.N. Security Council imposes economic sanctions against Iraq and calls for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Aug 10	United States prepares to deploy hospital ships UNSN Comfort and USNS Mercy to southwest Asia;

⁴⁷Chronology of events through 1 December 1991 from Downey, Robert W., Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Participation in Operation Desert Shield (As of 15 January 1991), Center for Naval Analyses, January 1991, p. 4-6.

Joint Chiefs of Staff consider reserve recall to provide support to the Desert Shield operation.

- Aug 17 SECDEF asks military departments and JCS to prepare plan for call-up of reserves.
- Aug 22 President Bush authorizes the call-up of selected reserves under the authority of Title 10 U.S. Code, section 673b and notifies Congress of the call-up.
- Aug 23 SECDEF directs the involuntary call-up of selected reserve (SELRES) units and individuals to active duty. Service-specific call-up ceilings are issued. The Navy ceiling is 6,300 and the Marine Corps ceiling is 3,000.
- Aug 24 Initial elements of Navy reserves called, including 2,400 medical personnel to backfill CONUS hospitals for staffs ordered to hospital ships and other deployed units. Also called were 800 personnel with Military Sealift Command (MSC) units, mobile inshore underwater warfare (MIUS) teams, and ocean minesweeper (MSO) crews.
- Sept 6 Additional Navy reserves in cargo handling and combat helicopter search and rescue (SAR) units slated for recall.
- Sept 13 Navy control of shipping (NCS), intelligence and logistics support units and personnel are added to call-up plan.
- Oct 10 Marines order activation of first unit from reserves--a combat service support detachment (CSSD) to replace an active unit deployed to the Persian Gulf.
- Oct 29 The call-up period of active-duty service for combat reserves is extended from 90 days/180 days to 180 days/360 days (specifically for operation Desert Shield during FY 1991 by provision of the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1991.
- Nov 8 President Bush orders more than 150,000 additional troops to the Persian Gulf.
- Nov 9 SECDEF announces the end of plans for rotation of troops assigned to the Persian Gulf. Troops in-theater will remain for duration of operation.
- Nov 13 Reserve call up authority increased to 126,250 by SECDEF. Navy ceiling is 10,000; Marine Corps ceiling is 15,000.
- Nov 30 Army activates its first combat units.
- Dec 1 SECDEF increases recall authority to 189,250. Navy ceiling is increased to 30,000 and Marine Corps to 23,000.
- Jan 16 Coalition air offensive begins.
- Jan 18 President Bush issues executive order authorizing the ordering of the ready reserve to active duty under Title 10 U.S. Code section 673.

Jan 19 Reservists ordered to active duty under 673b have their status altered and are placed on active duty under 673. Recall ceiling is increased to 360,000 Ready Reserves.

Feb 23 Ground offensive begins.

Feb 27 President Bush orders ground offensive suspended.

2. Composition of the Navy's Total Force

Understanding of the Total Force Plan implementation requires, as background, some familiarity with the overall end-strength of that force and the relative contributions of the various components. Figure 3-1 shows the various elements of the total force and their relative percentages. This figure is based on fiscal 1991 projections, and comprises a total of 1,682,400 personnel. Note that 45 percent of the total force is comprised of SELRES and personnel in the three PIM categories. This means that nearly half of the total force requires specific Presidential or Congressional action in order to be available during a crisis.

Total Reserve manpower available at the outset of Desert Shield (as of 31 July 1990) is shown in Figure 3-2. All categories of Navy Reserve personnel--Ready, Standby and Retired--combined provided a total pool of nearly 425,000. This figure shows the relative size of each element of the reserve force for both officer and enlisted personnel.

TOTAL FORCE COMPOSITION

PERCENTAGES PROJECTED FOR FY 1992





FIGURE 3-1 Total Force Composition

3. Procedures for Call-up

a. Recall and Validation of Requirements

Accessibility of reserve personnel is a complex issue. Table 3-1 shows the various statutory options available under which reservists may be involuntarily recalled. Most of these require either a declaration of war or national emergency. The major exception is 10 USC 673b, which allows calling up to 200,000 SELRES for operational requirements. This was passed in 1976 and tested for the first time during Desert Shield. Even these somewhat understate the issue, since domestic and international politics also play a significant role. For example, a reserve recall is a strong signal to the international community of U.S. resolve. Depending on the size of the recall and the world political climate, this may be either reassuring or alarming.

Once the decision is made to recall, requirements must be tied to strategic requirements. The pre-existing Navy contingency plan



U. S. Navy Reserve resources as of 31 July 1990

Source: Navy Total Force Report, Fy 91

FIGURE 3-2 Reserve Strength

for a Persian Gulf conflict "provided the basis for the initial Navy estimates of the reserve requirements for Desert Shield."⁴⁸ These were subject to SECDEF guidance regarding the Desert Shield call-up. The initial SECDEF guidance included the following four considerations:

⁴⁸Downey, Robert W. Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Participation in Operation Desert Shield (As of 15 January 1991), Center for Naval Analyses 141, January 1991, p. 15.

Table 3-1 RECALL AUTHORITIES

LAW	INVOKED BY	PURPOSE	APPLICABILITY
10 USC 673	PRESIDENT	NATIONAL EMERGENCY	READY RESERVE
10 USC 673b	PRESIDENT	OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS	SELECTED RESERVE
10 USC 672a	CONGRESS	WAR, NATIONAL EMERGENCY	READY, STAND-BY, RETIRED RESERVE
10 USC 672b	SECNAV	NO PURPOSE SPECIFIED	SELECTED RESERVE
10 USC 6489a1	CONGRESS	WAR, NATIONAL EMERGENCY	FLEET RESERVE
10 USC 6489a2	PRESIDENT	NATIONAL EMERGENCY	FLEET RESERVE
10 USC 688	SECNAV	NATIONAL DEFENSE INTERESTS	RETIREES (USN & USNR); FLEET RESERVE

Source: Total Force Report to Congress

- It would be based only on the projected needs for Desert Shield.
- It would be based on the current force structure and would not provide support for other possible contingencies.
- It would not include Army Reserve or Coast Guard combat units.
- It would be governed by application of the 90-day limitation on a unit-by-unit basis, rather than being measured from the initial call-up of reserves.

After review of the contingency plans, SELRES requirements were developed by requesting updated deployment requirements from the theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). These, in turn, were provided by the service operational elements reporting to the CINCs, the Fleet and Type Commanders, in the Navy's case. The Naval Military Personnel Command, along with the reserve command, calculated current onboard manning and projected manning for two, four and nine months into the future. These force projections were compared to status of currently

673 RECALL ACTION FLOW




Figure 3-3 Recall Process

Source: OP-095 briefing

deployed units and units scheduled for deployment in December 1990 and the second quarter of fiscal 1991, as well as those not scheduled for deployment until later in 1991. Manning level projections compared to authorized billets determined critical shortfalls. Manning of 100 percent of billets authorized, which is not generally maintained during peacetime deployments, was required to ensure a high level of readiness throughout the fleet.⁴⁹

⁴⁹CDR Davilli, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, information paper, January 1991.

The activation process used by the Navy is summarized in figure 3-4, provided by the CNO staff (OPNAV), code OP-095, Director of the Naval Reserve. As it shows, after validated requirements were received by CNO they were forwarded to OP-601, Mobilization Policy, which coordinated with OP-095, the Deputy CNO, and OP-01, Personnel, as well as COMNAVRESFOR. After this coordination had been effected, the actual call-up process was initiated. Throughout the operation, the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) was responsible for keeping Congress informed of call-up actions.

Identification of manpower requirements under a mobilization scenario is guided by the NAMMOS system, which contains validated mobilization billets derived from the data in the SMD, SQMD and SHMD. However, Desert Shield was a recall of individuals, rather than a mobilization. Therefore, NAMMOS, which focuses on units rather than individuals, could be used only as a general guide and was somewhat less helpful than it would have been in the mobilization it was designed to support.

The first recall increment contained authorization for the Navy and Marine Corps to call 6,300 and 3,000 people respectively. This was increased in November to 10,000 for the Department of Navy (DON), and subsequently to 30,000 and then to 44,000 each, USNR and USMCR.⁵⁰ It should be noted that the SECDEF establishes a ceiling for the number of reservists who may be called by each service. It is then up to the service chiefs to determine how much of their total authorized number they will actually call.

b. Processing Recalled Reservists

(1) *Mobilization vs. Recall.* The primary difference between a recall and a mobilization is that a mobilization allows personnel to be processed as units, thus simplifying and streamlining

⁵⁰Downey, p. 4-6.

the administrative procedures involved. The large-scale involuntary recall invoked in Desert Shield/Desert Storm was unprecedented. With few exceptions, reservists had to be processed as individuals, each with his or her own set of orders and all of the accompanying paperwork. The complexity of this process is well described in Appendix

A, COMNAVRESFOR Memorandum for NAVRESFOR Activities, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY.

Once a manpower requirement was validated and the individual to fill it was identified, the person was required to report to either the Naval Reserve Activity (NRA) or the local Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) for processing to active duty. Each reservist required an individual set of orders, as well as transportation arrangements to the ultimate duty station. Each reservist required an individual W-4 for federal income tax, a DD 205B for state income tax, and enrollment in the Direct Deposit System (DDS). Each service record had to be individually verified for date of service (DOS) and obligated service (OBLISERV). The service record entry for history of assignments (NP1070/609) had to be individually updated for each activated reservist. Individual applications for Dependent Identification Cards ((DD Form 1172) had to be completed, and families processed for access to military medical care. Risk factor screening/physical readiness test results (OPNAV 6110/2) had to be obtained and filed in each service record. These actions represent only the tip of the iceberg of the actions necessary to transfer a reservist to active status.

A major factor in the processing operation was the incompatibility of the various information systems involved. Reservists are carried in the RTSS; active duty members in SDS. In order to gain a reservist to active duty, the individual had to be detached from SELRES and gained under the SDS system. However, lack of communication capability between RTSS and SDS required that each transaction be

handled manually at the outset of the operation. A further complication was that the RTSS system extended only to echelon four of the reserve command. At echelon five a different system, RSTARS, is in effect. This system also lacked capability to communicate with RTSS. Since RSTARS is a batch processing system and not linked to RTSS, timing of updates regarding individuals filling billets did not always match. This resulted in some discrepancies between individuals requested for active duty, based on their qualifications, and those who actually received orders.

The lack of match-up between RTSS and RSTARS also became evident in the notification of gaining commands. The Logistic Support Mobilization Plan (LSMP) calls for the Reserve Center to notify the gaining command of a reservist's arrival. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm this function was assumed by COMNAVRESFOR. On some occasions, COMNAVRESFOR would notify a gaining command of the assignment of a particular number of reservists, based on information available in the RTSS of assignment and Reserve Billet Sequence Code (RBSC). However, COMNAVRESFOR, which did not have access to RSTARS, might not know that some percentage of those reservists would fall under various deferment categories and, therefore, would not deploy. In this case, a gaining command might be notified by COMNAVRESFOR to expect ten reservists, and only six would actually arrive.⁵¹

The situation was particularly complex with regard to ship augmentation personnel. In some cases, afloat Commanding officers (COs) were able to cross-deck qualified active personnel from ashore or other afloat commands. Rarely would the Reserve command structure be aware that some of the billets they were ostensibly trying to fill had been filled with active personnel. Upon receipt of a message to expect a given number of reservists, ships were sometimes faced with a lack of

⁵¹Bishop, Debbie, COMNAVRESFOR Code 4, Mobilization Analyst, interview, 13 May 1991.

bunks for incoming personnel. In these cases, it was necessary to cancel or reassign the activated reservists. Afloat commands also posed a special challenge with regard to Point of Embarkation (POE). With personnel generally moving as individuals rather than as units, transportation arrangements were difficult in any event; the necessity of hitting a moving target simply exacerbated the situation.

(2) *Process Chronology.* A different look at the chronology of the reserve augmentation for Desert Shield is provided in Table 3-2. This summary looks at the recall from a reserve policy standpoint, identifying the milestone dates for key policy decisions/actions. This table shows the incremental nature of the buildup in the context of policy decisions. For example, the initial CNO message on reserve activation specified a 24-hour report time. This was extended to five days early in January, and to ten days by the end of January, as difficulties arose for reservists in adjusting personal affairs. This necessity points to an area which should be closely examined in development of future plans: the warning time required for reservists to be activated, and the impact of this warning time on readiness and force mix decisions. Information in this table was provided by the Naval War College, which has developed an extensive timeline of all events related to reserve augmentation for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

B. MISSIONS OF NAVY RESERVES EMPLOYED IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

1. Conceptual Strategy of Force Mix

The role of reservists differs in the air and ground strategies of warfighting, which is reflected in the reserve force strategies of the different services. The Army, in particular, organizes reservists into commissioned, or self-sustaining, units. Under present maritime strategy, the Navy focuses on using reservists as augmenters of existing commands, concentrating on using reservists to backfill those billets vacated by active personnel transferred to combatant operations, as well

TABLE 3-2 PROCESS CHRONOLOGY

MEMO/MESSAGE	SUBJECT	POLICY
CNO 241943Z AUG 90	Reserve activation, deferment & exemption policy	24 hr report unless deferred
CNO 251751Z OCT 90	DS Outprocessing requirements	Specifies outprocessing procedures
COMNAVRESFOR 011212z NOV 90	Rqmts for voluntary short term recall	Voluntary recall procedures
CNO 162243Z NOV 90	Extension of active duty for SELRES	Extends all SELRES to 180 days
OP-132F2 Memo 29 November 1990	Increase in Navy's recall auth	Reasons to increase recall
CNO 061002Z DEC 90	Admin guidance/admin requirements	SELRES participation rqmts
CNO 072338Z DEC 90	Rotation of personnel in support of DS	Cancels plan for rotation of AOR personnel
CNO 040008Z JAN 91	Reserve recall	Extends report time to 5 days
CNO 072011Z JAN 91	Extension of active duty for SELRES	Recall extended to 180 days
CNO 240012Z JAN 91	Reserve recall	Extends report time to 10 days
CNO 252050Z JAN 91	Extension of active duty for SELRES	Extends all SELRES to 12-month
CNO Memo 5 February 1991	Call of Navy IRR to active duty	Approved recall increment one
CNO 131458Z	Pers pol for transfers and reliefs	Amplifies policy relating to transfers
CNO 081825Z MAR 91	Release from active duty of Ready Reservists	Guidance for return and transition

Source: Naval War College, CDR Mel Chaloupka

as to augment Coast Guard (which also transfers to the Navy in time of war) efforts in protecting U.S. coastal waters. During the current mobilization, a large number of the Navy reservists activated were Medical Corps and Medical Service Corps personnel. Other reservists

reported to their gaining commands, deployed at sea or stationed ashore, to increase the unit manning to 100 percent and fulfill emerging requirements related to the crisis.

2. Reserve Missions and Force Structure Mix

The Navy's Report on the Total Force FY 91, p. 3, points out, "The goal of Navy's Total Force policy is to completely integrate the two most combat-ready elements - the Active Duty and SELRES forces - into an operational arm prepared for immediate employment, supported by the Civilian element and augmented, at mobilization, by personnel in the PIM." Since it is impossible to predict with 100 percent accuracy which mission elements will be needed in a particular contingency, transfer of missions between active and reserve components is a complex task, tied as closely as possible to the National Threat Scenario, but influenced as much or more by political and financial concerns. In fact, the Total Force Utilization Study found that, "Economic and political considerations drove the development of the total force. Strategic 1 considerations played at best a minor role."⁵²

Table 3-3 shows the major Naval Reserve mission areas as a percentage of the Navy's total capability (as of fiscal 1989).⁵³ This reflects the force mix decisions which have been made since the inception of the Total Force Plan. Those missions which appear most specifically related to combat-only environments have the heaviest concentration in the reserve component, such as light attack helicopter squadrons. Those requirements which must be met during peacetime as well as in war have lesser concentrations of capabilities residing in the reserves. Some areas, such as medical and intelligence, routinely integrate their reserve assets into peacetime operations, both during weekend drills and annual training.

⁵²Hall, John V., Final Report Of the Total Force Utilization Study, CNA Research Memorandum 87-82, July 1987, p. 1.

⁵³A Report On the Navy's Total Force FY 91, p. 4.

TABLE 3-3 MAJOR NAVAL RESERVE MISSION AREAS AND PERCENTAGE OF NAVY'S TOTAL MISSION CAPABILITY, FISCAL 1989

<u>MISSION AREA</u>	<u>PERCENT OF CAPABILITY</u>
Logistic Airlift Squadrons (CONUS)	100
Fighter/Composite Squadrons (CONUS)	100
Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons	100
Strike Rescue/Special Warfare	100
Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	100
Naval Control of Shipping	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	93
Military Sealift Command	85
Mine Warfare Ships	82
Mobile Construction Battalions	68
Special Boat Forces	57
Fleet Hospitals	53
Maritime Patrol Squadrons	35
Intelligence/Security Group	35
Medical Support Personnel	34
LAMPS ASW Squadrons	33
HELO MCM Squadrons	25
Frigates (FFG-7/FF-1052)	24
EOD Mobile Units	24
Carrier Air Wings	14

Source: Report on the Navy's Total Force FY 91

Table 3-4 summarizes the Desert Storm recall as of 14 March 1991, providing a basis for comparison with the reserve mission areas shown above. It should be noted that the Desert Shield/Desert Storm recall included reservists from virtually all mission areas. However, the mission areas which were most heavily represented were medical, sealift, logistics, service-support, and intelligence.⁵⁴

The initial phase of the call-up focused particularly on medical personnel. As Downey points out, "These were primarily the medical staffs called to backfill CONUS hospital vacancies that resulted from the deployment of active duty members to staff the hospital ships and fleet hospitals."⁵⁵ This philosophy represented a departure from

⁵⁴Downey, Robert W., Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Participation in Operation Desert Shield (As of 15 January 1991), January 1991, p. 2.

⁵⁵Downey, p. 8.

TABLE 3-4 MARCH RECALL STATUS REPORT

RECALL SUMMARY a/o 14 MAR 91

TYPE UNIT	PLAN EST.	CNO AUTH	RECALLED	ON BRD	CONUS
MEDICAL	17,000	16,600	10,452	10,234	6,516
MOBILE INSHORE UNDERSEA WARFARE	450	450	334	33	6
MINE SWEEPERS	100	61	88	42	16
MSC	500	450	452	399	248
NCS	250	200	89	78	15
INTELLIGENCE	500	450	387	339	197
LOGISTICS SUPPORT	4,500	3,029	2,482	2,334	1,000
OTHER/MISC	3,250	1,560	1,282	977	733
COMBAT SAR (HCS)	100	48	28	2	0
CARGO HANDLING					
BATTALIONS/STAFF	1,150	1,150	841	840	60
SEABEES	3,500	2,747	2,475	2,454	21
SHIP AUGMENT	12,700	6,500	1,838	1,280	485
TOTALS	44,000	33,245	20,968	19,339	9,963

Source: Unpublished information paper, SECNAV DASN for Manpower

earlier thinking, when hospital ships had designated SELRES units. These units were eliminated in favor of drawing active personnel to staff hospital ships, backfilling with reservists. One difficulty which emanated from this approach is that hospital ships require non-medical personnel who are not normally associated with hospital units. While non-medical personnel from other areas were designated to man these

ships when they got underway, the personnel filling these billets had been assigned to other tasks in the interim, tasks which did not have reservists identified as backfill. Aviation personnel to man the hospital ship's flight deck are a good example of the type of shortage caused by this approach. Cross-assignment of personnel from other units was required in order to meet this need.⁵⁶

In addition to medical requirements, Navy reserve augmentation requirements in the early stages of the operation were strongly tied to support for force deployment, sealift and shipping, and intelligence and security.

Differences between planning estimates of reserve requirements, recall ceilings authorized by CNO, and actual numbers recalled were shown in Table 3-4, previously introduced. As it shows, although a few communities recalled more than the number listed under CNO authorizations, the number who actually reported aboard--the critical figure when dealing with authorizations--was less in each case. In most cases, planning figures and CNO authorizations were quite close. Numbers actually recalled showed a greater degree of disparity.

The most significant differences were seen in the area of ship's augmentation personnel. Although 12,700 were called for in planning estimates, this was reduced to 6,500 for authorized ceilings. This figure, in turn, was reduced still further, to 1,838 for number recalled, of whom about two-thirds actually had reported aboard by 14 March 91. Service deferments were more of a factor in this area than in other areas.

C. ISSUES

As described, the recall process was highly complex, involving a large number of issues which had not previously been covered in existing plans. Each required study, resolution, and promulgation of policy

⁵⁶Parke, CDR Tom, OP-095, interview, 13 May 1991.

guidance. These involved entitlements, deferments, and administrative and processing procedures.

1. Pay and Entitlements

One of the major areas claiming attention was that of compensation. Specifically, entitlement to permanent change of station (PCS) allowances, such as household goods movement, had to be addressed, given the length of time covered by the individual's orders. Ultimately, the decision was made that per diem would be authorized for reservists and that they would not be entitled to PCS allowances.

Personnel recalled for Desert Shield and their pay records fell into one of three categories, all of which required slightly different handling:

(1) SELRES assigned to INCONUS active duty command with SELRES records maintained by the local Personnel Support Detachment (PSD).

(2) SELRES assigned to OUTCONUS host command with SELRES record maintained by overseas PSD/personnel office servicing host command.

(3) SELRES assigned to OUTCONUS host command with SELRES record maintained by INCONUS PSD.

All SELRES personnel were designated to be ultimately separated from active duty INCONUS. The specific procedures varied with their category of assignment, as described above. While these procedures were not grossly different, developing responsive procedures and ensuring that they were properly publicized was a major effort during the operation.

2. Deferments

Identifying the conditions under which a recalled reservist could be excused or deferred from serving was a major area of concern. This involved two sets of questions: those related to changes in status and those related to personal deferment.

Changes in status included requests for transfer between units, change from SELRES to IRR status, requests for retirements, and release from active duty due to end of service obligation. In some cases, reservists had the option to reenlist, extend, or be discharged at the end of their obligation. If they lacked sufficient obligated service, most could not be deployed, although some stop-loss provisions applied. Reserve activity Cos had the authority to approve transfers between pay units, and could not delegate this authority.

A number of actions were taken by the Navy to accommodate personal problems which could have affected deployability. While early messages directed reporting of recalled personnel within 24 hours, reporting time was later extended to five days and, still later, to ten days. This was to support the reservists in arranging their personal affairs.

Various categories were identified for deferment. They included medical, school, judicial, and personal. Medical reasons for deferment included hospitalization, convalescence, evaluation for retention, positive HIV test, or pregnancy. Reservists under the age of 20 who were still in high school and those who had not completed their basic training were exempted for school. College students, ROTC members, and students in professional curricula were activated with their units, unless their contracts stipulated that activation was precluded. Physicians and nurses in training in critical areas were also exempted.

Relatively few personal reasons for deferment were acceptable except on a case-by-case basis. Navy guidance specified that those with military spouses or sole parents were to be activated. Sole surviving sons and daughters were to be activated but not deployed unless they volunteered. Procedures were established for individuals to be exempted due to extreme personal hardship. These cases were reviewed by

COMNAVRESFOR and decided by the SECNAV. Financial hardship and essentiality of civilian occupation were specifically excluded.

3. Administrative and Processing Procedures

In addition to the categorization differences above, the administrative processing of reservists raised numerous questions, which had to be addressed by the staff responsible for implementing the recall. A few of these are responsibility for approving transfer between pay billets, processing of retirement requests, updating dependent care plans, processing differences required for those who voluntarily returned to active duty as opposed to those involuntarily recalled, guidance procedures for personnel evaluations for recalled reservists, authorization to sell unused accrued leave.

D. SUMMARY

The reserve recall process was a massive undertaking. This first use of the Presidential reserve augmentation authority under 673b presented many first-time issues, which required rapid assessment and resolution, allowing little time to determine the long-term ramifications and precedents which were set by the process. The lack of pre-existing plans for this eventuality directly affected the development of the process itself. This is analyzed in the next chapter.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. ISSUE ANALYSIS IN CONTEXT

The issues which developed in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm reserve recall process can be analyzed most effectively in the context of previous experience. Both real world and exercise experience provide a basis for comparison with the process during this contingency operation. However, recent, real-world recall experience was conspicuously absent. The "200K" authority under 673b was enacted in 1976, and had not, previously, been exercised. The most recent contingency-related Navy Reserve recall occurred in 1968, in support of the Pueblo crisis. Beyond that, most relevant experience comes from exercises, though exercise experience is also severely limited.

1. Pueblo Experience

At first glance, the experience associated with the Pueblo recall might appear too remote and limited to be of value in analysis of current experience. In that era, before the All Volunteer Force and the Total Force Plan were conceived, the assumptions associated with use of Reserve Forces were entirely different. Since the inception of the Total Force Plan, reserve readiness has reached an all time high, as noted earlier. Equipment has been upgraded. The reserve force today is very different than the Naval Reserve of 1968. In addition, the Pueblo recall was small, in comparison with Desert Shield/Desert Storm; the six squadrons recalled were quietly released from active duty six months later without ever having left CONUS. With all of these differences, how could one find a parallel between this event and Desert Shield?

One finds it in the post-recall lessons-learned analysis. After the Pueblo recall, two major problem areas were cited: difficulties in enacting a recall as compared to a mobilization and lack

of congruity between reserve and active systems.⁵⁷ Twenty-three years later, these same issues were to haunt the implementers of the Desert Shield recall, despite all the changes in assumptions, intentions, and capabilities which occurred in the interim.

2. Exercise Experience

Focus on reserve integration into conflict scenarios has been growing through the years since the inception of the Total Force Plan. In July 1989, enhanced reserve play⁵⁸ was incorporated into a major war game for the first time with its inclusion in Global War Game (GWG) 89. The opportunity was valuable but the picture was not encouraging.⁵⁹

The GWG series of exercises has "had a significant impact on the nation's approach to global conflict and national strategy."⁶⁰ The decision to enhance reserve play in this exercise is indicative of concerns and influential thinking among defense and government leadership. In 1989, GWG provided a picture of multiple crises and regional conflicts, set in 1995. As a result of the multiple fronts involved, active forces became overextended and force expansion became a necessity. Recall of reservists became a critical option as well as a means of signalling national will and commitment.

a. Global War Game 89 Results

The pivotal question is, "What happened?" Guthrie et al. identify three major learning points.⁶¹

The first issue to emerge was that existing operational plans and prescribed force lists were not sufficiently flexible. They

¹Guthrie et al., "The Reserve Is Ready and Waiting," Proceedings, September 1990, p. 50.

⁵⁸The terms "play" and "players" are commonly used to refer to the process and participants in wargames.

⁵⁹Guthrie et al., p. 50.

⁶⁰Ibid, p. 50.

⁶¹Guthrie et al., "The Reserve is Ready and Waiting," Proceedings, September 1990.

did not provide exercise players with workable guidelines to follow in enacting a reserve augmentation. The lack of incorporation of reserve planning into global war scenarios, as well as lack of experience with real world recalls left players at a disadvantage. They did not have the resources and solutions at their fingertips which were necessary in this case. Thus, they were forced to invent entirely new approaches to solving the problems presented as the scenario developed.

Second, many players had a misconception of the role of 673b, or "200k" authority, in the augmentation process, regarding it as the first step in a mobilization under conditions of national emergency, rather than the discretionary Presidential recall it really is. There was a tendency to respond inflexibly to implementation of the 200K authority by expanding automatically to the full 200,000-reservist ceiling authorized, rather than tailoring the recall to the individual requirements of a specific mission. As Guthrie et al, point out, "Flexibility suffered from undue reliance on 'scripted' forces outlined in the joint planning guidance."

The third point is related to the second. Experience during GWG 89 indicated a tendency for each service to immediately exercise recall authority to its full-share ceiling, in order to prevent portions from being reassigned to other services. The effect was to reduce joint staff reapportionment flexibility, as well as to risk sending unintended signals to the U.S. and the rest of the world.⁶²

The second and third points were also observed during PACEX 89, a combined Command Post and Field Training exercise which occurred immediately after GWG 89, during August and September 1989. This was also a joint exercise which took place throughout the Pacific area of responsibility, and was the largest mobilization of forces in the Pacific since World War II. Both the tendency to regard 673b as a

⁶²Ibid, p. 50.

short stop on the road to full 673 implementation, and the tendency to immediately recall to ceiling authorizations rather than respond to specific requirements were noted by participants.⁶³

On balance, the learning experiences represented here pointed out the need for more flexible plans and selective, tailored utilization of reserve assets to meet specific requirements.

b. Comparison of GWG 89 Experience with Desert Shield/Desert Storm

The Desert Shield/Desert Storm reserve recall, as described in the previous chapter, was an incremental, evolutionary process. It is apparent, therefore, that at least one of the lessons learned above had been taken to heart and a potential problem averted: immediate recall to ceiling authorization levels, regardless of validated manpower requirements and specific scenario-dependent needs.

However, not surprisingly, given the short amount of time which had passed since the exercise was conducted, the basic problem remained: existing plans and force lists, coupled with prior experience did not provide sufficient flexibility and forced key staff members to develop new ways to solve problems virtually overnight. In this area, the real-world test validated the concerns of the exercise.

3. Human Cost of Accomplishing the Mission

The cost of accomplishing the mission was high, due to the lack of adequate, flexible, requirement-driven plans. Incorporating the matching of sailors and requirements needed was difficult and resulted in high labor intensity and large potential for error.

Navy scenarios had become dependent on unit mobilization instead of individual recall. To match billets with sailors, systems had to be adapted, and, in many cases, new and complex programs had to

⁶³Author's personal experience as Exercise Fleet Counterintelligence Officer for CINCPACFLT during much of PACEX 89

be written before requirements could be met. This was both manpower-intensive and untimely.⁶⁴

Because each recall had to be accomplished individually, the functional requirements of Desert Shield far exceeded day-to-day system capabilities, creating a backlog. Moreover, the individualization was manual-input driven, vastly increasing the potential for errors; and errors occurred in various areas, most notably pay, as a result. For example, a recalled Senior Chief Petty Officer's grade was mistakenly changed to that of a Third Class Petty Officer. Naturally, this occupied quite a bit of his attention until the problem was corrected.⁶⁵

Another example is that of a recalled lieutenant commander who was first assigned to Military Sealift Command headquarters and later sent to the Persian Gulf. For some reason, the form requesting direct deposit of pay, required of each recalled reservist, had not been received by Navy Finance Center, nor had the endorsement to his orders. It took the intervention of CNO staff before his wife was finally able to receive an allotment check the second week of February.

Incidents of this type can cause major morale problems for the individuals and their families, and may have widespread impact on others who hear of them, affecting the perception of a Navy which does nor does not "take care of its own." Many of the reservists who were recalled were already experiencing significant reductions in their income through leaving their civilian jobs and returning to military compensation. Adding difficulties with receiving their full pay and allowances to this equation risks creating long-term disillusionment. This conceivably

⁶⁴From a briefing provided by OP-130R.

⁶⁵Skeen, David R., OP-16, "Resolution of Navy Personnel Information Deficiencies," (Briefing), 8 Feb 91.

could have a greater impact on continuation rates in SELRES than the inconveniences and hardships of the recall itself.

Morale is not the only area which suffers when this type of difficulty is widespread. Wise and conscientious Cos have long practiced the principle that people are their first concern, and paying their people is a major priority. The CO at a major Navy support base for Desert Storm reported problems ensuring that recalled Reserves had accurate, updated personnel records which supported their active duty benefits, as well as problems ensuring that reservists were paid properly. He focused a great deal of concentration on getting the problem solved, taking time from war planning, billeting, and logistic transport requirements which were also under his domain.

B. RAMIFICATIONS FOR TOTAL FORCE PLANNING

1. Threat Environment and Evolving U.S. Strategy

As noted in chapter II, the threat environment has changed significantly, which affects the future of total force planning. The significance of the President's decision to use 673(b) authority during Desert Shield/Desert Storm cannot be over-emphasized, particularly in light of the changing threat environment. This decision sets a precedent, and addresses the long-standing concern felt by Navy leadership that reserve assets would be unavailable in a crisis. Though this concern is not totally eliminated by one operation, the support generated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm for reserve utilization further emphasizes the necessity of realistic planning for incorporating reserve assets into contingency planning.

The need for this planning is one of the major lessons learned from the operation. The lack of systemic support and existing implementation plans to support a recall of this size was one of the major obstacles faced by Navy implementers. Since no two contingencies are ever exactly alike, a graduated system of personnel conditions, with accompanying implementation plans, would be needed to guide future

implementations. One of the major contributions such planning could make would be to identify the questions that need to be asked at the outset. This is far preferable to an ad hoc reaction to questions as they arise.

The changing threat environment has necessitated modifying planning in many arenas. Although this means that planners are fully tasked, it also means that the time is ripe for adding a greater degree of sophistication to manpower planning for incorporation of reserve assets. This also promotes another look at force-mix decisions. As U.S. strategy focuses more strongly on regional conflict scenarios, the role of reserves in regional and low-intensity conflict will call for more attention from operational and personnel planners.

As noted in chapter II, other services, in particular the Army, have previously made force mix decisions which committed them to using reserve assets in any conflict scenario. Their dependence on these assets is reflected in the systemic support which they have provided to reserve integration. These systems need to be examined by Navy manpower analysts and mobilization staff, to see if they can be incorporated into future Navy planning.

2. Resource Environment

Cost is a major pressure driving the shift of assets to the reserve components. The general indication is that reserve forces are less costly than active forces. This differs by type of unit and type of manning, and specific cost questions are outside the scope of this analysis. However, one issue which emerged from the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation has clear resource implications: systemic support for integrating active and reserve information systems. The lack of congruity and interface between SDS, RTSS, and RSTARS necessitated individual handling and "band-aid" solutions. Ultimately, if "One Navy" is to be more than just an ideal, the systems must be integrated in ways which support both peacetime and contingency

requirements. This will not be cost-free, but it is essential to professional handling of reserve recalls in the future.

3. Manpower Requirements

Planning concerns and resource concerns come together in identification and validation of manpower requirements. Initially, enthusiasm for the NAMMOS system was high. It was a definite step in the direction of systematizing mobilization requirements. As Cronin points out:

NAMMOS lived up to its original expectations. For the first time, the Navy had a means of systematically assessing manpower requirements for mobilization, related to a specific scenario, and identifying which billets should be held by selected reservists.⁶⁶

However, NAMMOS proved to be so exclusively oriented to mobilization, as opposed to partial mobilization or recall, that its deficiencies were highlighted by the Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience. The differences between planning estimates of recall requirements and actual recalls effected indicate that billets need to be re-examined and assets aligned with the needs they are most likely to be required to fulfill. Training can then be tailored to ensure maximum readiness.

One key to this area is involvement of gaining commands in the development and validation of manpower requirements. Personnel in OP-601 indicated that the gaining commands were the key element in identifying manpower requirements for the operation. Commands with active, pre-existing, horizontally-integrated relationships with their augmentation units had a definite advantage in the early days of the recall. They were more familiar with the capabilities of their reservists, the needs they could meet, and the actions required to bring them on board. Desert Shield/Desert Storm re-confirmed and re-emphasized the need for horizontal integration to become a reality.

⁶⁶Cronin, Patrick, The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective, CNA Research Memorandum 87-78, p. 35.

4. Training

Horizontal integration is also a key factor in training. The partnership needs to be dynamic on both sides, reserve and active. Gaining commands which were actively involved with the training of their reservists were in a better position to use those reservists effectively in a crisis. Horizontal integration which is limited to training on the same equipment does not promote an active partnership. As noted above, the attitude toward the reserves has evolved from the expectation that they would be primarily an augmentation force to the expectation of a force-in-being. If reserves are to be used in short-fuse contingencies in the future, the working relationships will need to be cultivated during peacetime.

There are several possible means of promoting this relationship. In an era of shrinking manpower resources, gaining commands need to be made aware of the mutual support aspects of an active partnership with their reserve units. Particularly during the transition to a smaller force, reserve assets represent a tremendous source of additional manpower to meet mission requirements. The reserve personnel would derive substantial training benefits from sharing the peacetime operational requirements of their gaining commands.

Gaining commands could also become more involved in certifying the training readiness of their reserve units and evaluating the personnel, particularly the CO. At present, though reservists have requirements for completing active duty for training with their gaining commands periodically, there are no mechanisms for continuing evaluation of the reserve unit by the gaining command. Requiring gaining command COs to certify the training readiness of their reserve units and to evaluate the CO during the normal evaluation period, perhaps on an Additional Duty (ADDU) basis, would provide these mechanisms.

A major lesson of Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that all elements of the total force are needed in a crisis. Therefore, the

mechanisms of peacetime must support the contingency requirements in every respect.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The recall process for Desert Shield/Desert Storm was successful in two ways: (1) the mission was accomplished. (2) it provided an object lesson in areas which need attention in order to enhance the future performance of the Total Force Plan.

A. RECALL VS. MOBILIZATION

Reserve assets can be used under conditions short of full mobilization. The planning and system development which take place in the wake of Desert Shield/Desert Storm must recognize and accommodate this reality. A system of graduated personnel conditions (PERSCONS), linked to contingency planning and supported by fully-developed implementation plans would have greatly facilitated the recent recall. This would require increasing the flexibility of the NAMMOS system to accommodate both recall and mobilization. Billets should be validated not only for various scenarios but for different PERSCON options. A comparison of current NAMMOS-validated billets with the actual requirements during Desert Shield/Desert Storm should provide some insight into future allocation of reserve personnel assets.

B. SYSTEMIC SUPPORT

The incompatibility of the various personnel information systems in use was a major source of delay and error during the recall. The recall was implemented under very labor-intensive conditions, often in spite of, rather than because of, the existing support systems. The systems in place were developed individually, each to meet a different set of requirements, and primarily those requirements which predominate under peacetime conditions. However, the purpose of the Navy is not to plan for peacetime conditions. Compatibility of systems is essential if the

Total Force Plan is to be adapted to constantly changing conditions and requirements.

The assumptions which were widely held in the Navy about accessibility of reserve personnel under conditions other than full mobilization may have influenced the way systems were developed. These assumptions are now being re-examined, in light of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience. Since some other services held different assumptions, their programs may offer some value to the Navy in the realignment of personnel information systems.

The actual experiences of Navy reservists during Desert Shield/Desert Storm may have an impact on future manpower availability, particularly in the area of continuation rates. This should be closely scrutinized.

C. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION

Publications which addressed the Total Force Plan's evolution in the Navy prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm emphasized the necessity of horizontal integration between active and reserve components. Resource allocation during recent years, particularly in the area of equipment procurement, has proven that the commitment to horizontal integration is real. However, the partnership aspects of horizontal integration need to be increased. Gaining commands need to regard their augmentation units as an integral part of the command's total assets. Commanding Officers have as much of a vested interest in the performance of their reserve units as in the active duty and civilian full-time employees who are part of their command's on a daily basis. Consequently, gaining command COs need to be actively involved in the training, certification, and personnel evaluation of those units.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing analysis and conclusions, the following recommendations are proposed:

- Develop flexible operational plans, tailored to meet the needs of varying scenarios, with an accompanying system of graduated personnel conditions and implementation plans.

- Increase the flexibility of the NAMMOS system to accommodate individual recall as well as unit mobilization.

- Compare NAMMOS-validated billets with actual contingency requirements to identify areas of shortfall or excess.

- Develop an integrated personnel information system which accommodates active and reserve personnel and vertical and horizontal information requirements.

- Increase interoperability and integration between SELRES units and their gaining commands, to ensure appropriate identification of manpower requirements and certification of training readiness.

- Task gaining commands to certify training readiness of their SELRES augmentation units.

- Develop an ADDU system in which reserve unit COs are evaluated by their gaining command CO on an ongoing basis.

- Ensure that the gaining command CO's evaluation of reserve the unit Commanding Officer is considered equally with reserve chain of command fitness reports.

That the Desert Shield/Desert Storm recall was implemented at all is a tribute to the historical capacity of Navy personnel to get the job done regardless of the obstacles faced. One of the most sobering aspects of this analysis is the fact that two of the major areas of concern which surfaced during Desert Shield/Desert Storm--systemic incompatibility and plans which focused on mobilization and excluded recall--were identified 23 years ago as lessons learned. This indicates that identifying what went wrong is insufficient grounds to say a lesson has been learned. Only when the requisite changes are made in current systems can the lesson truly be said to have been learned.

Implementing changes to solve the problems which surfaced during Desert Shield/Desert Storm will not be without cost. Realigning the personnel information systems, for example, will require a large expenditure. In fiscally austere times, these changes may be difficult to make. However, the cost involved needs to be balanced against the cost savings apparent in moving assets to the reserves and the cost of maintaining the reserve forces. The expenditures required appeared far less significant when the benefit of a fully-ready reserve force, easily accessible when required, is added to the equation.

Whenever the next reserve augmentation is required, whether it happens in months or whether another 23 years passes, there will be new lessons to be learned. Hopefully, the lessons which have been learned during this operation will not have to be re-learned in the next.

APPENDIX

This appendix contains the COMNAVRESFOR memorandum which spelled out the policy and procedures for the recall to active duty for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It supplements the information contained in chapter III.

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL NAVRESFOR ACTIVITIES

From: COMNAVRESFOR Code 223

Subj: ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR VOLUNTARY/
INVOLUNTARY RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY (UPDATE NUMBER ONE)

Ref: (a) COMNAVRESFOR NEW ORLEANS LA 2210002 AUG 90

Encl: (1) General Overview and Policy for Voluntary/Involuntary
Recall to Active Duty
(2) Administrative Processing Procedures for Voluntary/
Involuntary Recall to Active Duty
(3) Ultimate PSD maintaining Personal Financial Record
and Service Record
(4) Skeleton Service Record
(5) Active Duty Order Format
(6) Guide for Preparing Active Duty Orders
(7) SDS Worksheet
(8) Other Considerations

1. Reference (a) directs Naval Reserve Activities to download and use enclosures (1) through (8), as required, for the voluntary and involuntary recall of SELRES personnel to active duty.

2. Per CNO (OP-01) direction, administrative procedures in enclosures (1) through (8) must be followed to ensure prompt, efficient gains are applied, members are paid on time, and dependents receive appropriate entitlements.

3. Terms and acronyms used in enclosures (1) through (8) are defined as follows:

Co-located Site.....	PSD maintains SELRES record
DDS.....	Direct Deposit System
EOS.....	Expiration of Service
GSS.....	Geographically Separated Site
INCONUS.....	within Continental United States
MGIB.....	Montgomery GI Bill: entitlements earned on active duty.
MGIB-R.....	Montgomery GI Bill - Reserve; entitlements earned as SELRES
NRA.....	Naval Reserve Activity
OBLISERV.....	Obligated Service
OUTCONUS.....	outside Continental United States
PFR.....	Personal Financial Record (pay record)
PSD.....	Personnel Support Detachment
RTSS (TE).....	Reserve Training Support System (Technical Enhancement)
Servicing PSD.....	PSD processing initial gain to SDS and opens PFR
SDS.....	Source Data Systems
Ultimate PSD.....	PSD designated to maintain PFR and Service Record after recall

4. We will continue to keep you informed of revised processing procedures and provide updates as circumstances dictate. Continue to liaise with your servicing PSD to ensure all players are aware of current procedures.

5. POC concerning use of administrative recall procedures is COMNAVRESFOR (Code 27) at (504) 948-1247 or AUTOVON 363-1247.

PNCM Reed sends

GENERAL OVERVIEW AND POLICY FOR VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY RECALL TO
ACTIVE DUTY (UPDATE NUMBER ONE)

1. Recalled member reports to NRA for in-processing. Member remains at NRA (if GSS) or reports to PSD (if co-located) for processing to active duty.
2. Member completes processing paperwork per enclosure (2). Enclosure (3) provides ultimate disposition of member's PFR and service record.
3. Members ordered to a shore activity INCONUS or Hawaii will pick up tickets, service record, health and dental record, training record and PFR and travels to ultimate duty station. PSD servicing the ultimate duty station (INCONUS) will receive member in SDS and maintain service record and PFR, (See enclosure (3)).
5. Under no circumstances will PFRs and service records for SELRES personnel leave CONUS.
6. Ultimate PSDs will keep PFRs and service records for SELRES personnel separate from active duty personnel PFRs and service records and, if possible, dedicate a DK/YN/PN team at that PSD for records maintenance and liaison.
7. Ultimate PSDs will input entitlement data for personnel ordered to shore activities INCONUS or Hawaii (paragraph 3) via SDS in the normal manner. Payment will be made either through DDS or by check by the PSD holding the member's PFR.
8. Servicing PSDs will send entitlement data for personnel ordered to any afloat activity or any OUTCONUS activity (paragraph 4) to the ultimate PSD via message, mail or FAX for entry into SDS. Payment will be made by the PSD holding the member's PFR either through DDS or by check.
9. PSDs will make emergency payments to SELRES per PAYPERSMAN (paragraph 40310) and SDSPROMAN (paragraph B50209).
10. PSDs maintaining the service record and PFR will process member for release from active duty.

Enclosure (1)

Administrative Processing Procedures for the Voluntary/Involuntary
Recall of SELRES Personnel to Active Duty (Update #1)

1. Every reservist ordered to either voluntary or involuntary active duty will be recalled to their parent NRA for in-processing and processed on active duty by the NRA (for GSS) or supporting PSD (for co-located sites). NRAs and PSDs will complete the tasks listed below to process reservists being recalled for Operation "Desert Shield". The command responsible for performing the action is listed beside each task. The first command listed applies to NRAs co-located with a PSD. The second command listed applies to NRAs geographically separated from PSD (e.g. FSD/NRA: at co-located sites the PSD performs the action / at geographically separated sites NRA performs the action).

CO-LOCATED/GSS

a. Disbursing.

(1) Prepare W-4 for Federal Income tax PSD/NRA
Withholding (SDSPROMAN1, para. B70104 and PAYPERSMAN,
para. 70108).

(2) Prepare DD 205B for State Income Tax PSD/NRA
Withholding (SDSPROMAN, para. B70205 and PAYPERSMAN,
para. 70142).

(3) Each reservist will be required to enroll PSD/NRA
in DDS. To start DDS, the reservist must provide PSD
a copy of a deposit slip or a voided check. Obtain
mailing instructions from member for distribution of
checks issued before DDS is effected. Counsel members
who do not have a financial institution for DDS
concerning possible delays in receiving pay. Encourage
members to open an account before recall processing is
complete.

(4) Advise members with dependents requesting PSD/NRA
DDS enrollment of the dual DDS advisory option
(SDSPROMAN, para. B41013 and PAYPERSMAN, para. 40617).
If elected, obtain duplicate DDS advisory address from
member.

(5) Servicing PSD opens PFR. PSD/PSD

b. Personnel/Admin.

(1) Prepare active duty orders after
authorization is received per the format provided in
enclosure (5). Use enclosure (6) as a guide for preparing
orders. Supplemental orders and compliance/non-compliance codes
are in BUPERSINST 1001.39.

(2) Verify DOS, extend/reenlist as necessary. PSD/NRA
Personnel refusing to OBLISERV must be referred to
exemption processing if EOS occurs before expiration
of recall.

(3) Endorse recall to active duty orders with NRA/NRA
time and date member reported for active duty.
only to effect dependency changes. (Ref: PAYPERSMAN, Part 9
article 90434 and MILPERSMAN 5030240). Otherwise, PSD will prepare
smooth Page 2 from existing information without these documents
using SDS. Prepare a Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Election, VA
29-8286, if necessary. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5030300).

(5) Complete NP 1070/605, History of Assignments, PSD/NRA
entry indicating transfer from reserve unit, recall to
active duty, and transfer from NRA. (Ref: MILPERSMAN
5030360).

(6) Complete NP 1070/609, Enlisted Performance PSD/NRA
Record, entry indicating recall to active duty.
(Ref: MILPERSMAN 5030360).

(7) Prepare a NP 1070/613, Administrative Remarks, PSD/NRA
entry:

(a) Acknowledging recall to active duty and
duration of recall.

(b) Establishing Sea Duty Counter (Ref:
MILPERSMAN 2620100, SECNAVINST 7220.77 and ENLTRANSMAN, Chap
3, Art 3.10).

(8) Make Travel Arrangements/Reservations (BUPERSINST
4650.14F):

(a) Government Transportation Requests PSD/PSD

(b) Military Transportation Authorization PSD/PSD

(c) Port Call PSD/PSD

(d) Brief on individual travel, etc. (e.g. per PSD/NRA
diem entitlement)

(9) Prepare a Travel or Country Clearance. (Ref: PSD/PSD
OPNAVINST 4650.11E).

(10) Prepare rough Application for Dependent Identifi- PSD/NRA
cation Cards - DD Form 1172.

(11) Enter DEERS enrollment information in RAPIDS. PSD/PSD
(Ref: OPNAVINST 1750.2).

(12) Verify Service Record - compare against health NRA/NRA
and dental records (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5030120, 1C and 1E).

Enclosure (2)

- (a) Obtain training record for inclusion in package accompanying member to ultimate duty station. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5010200). NRA/NRA
- (b) Obtain Risk Factor Screening/Physical Readiness Test Results, OPNAV 6110/2 and file in service record (Ref: OPNAVINST 6110.1D). PSD/NRA
- (c) Obtain dental and health records for inclusion in package accompanying member to ultimate duty station. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5010260). PSD/NRA
- (13) Prepare NAVPERS 7041/1 Travel Information Card. (Ref: NMPCINST 7040.1A). PSD/NRA
- (14) Verify member has identification tags. If not, make arrangements for issuance, if required. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 4610150). NRA/NRA
- (15) Issue Geneva Convention Card to appropriate medical and religious personnel. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 46201100). PSD/NRA
- (16) Obtain a current DD Form 1435, COMSEC Maintenance Training and Experience Record if member is a Cryptologic Technician (Maintenance). (Ref: MILPERSMAN 6650200). NRA/NRA
- (17) Interview foreign Nationals to determine the accuracy of recorded citizenship data. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5030450). NRA/NRA
- (18) Counsel single parents or military couples with dependents (E-6 and below). Complete current OPNAV Form 1740/1, Department of Navy Dependent Care Certificate for all single parents and military couples with dependents and file in service record. (Ref: OPNAVINST 1740.4). NRA/NRA
- (19) Advise member if receiving MGIB benefits that collection by the Veterans' Administration (VA) of over-payments for the current semester is required. Active duty Master Military Pay Account (MMPA) - SDS event officer enrollment code is "1" (INELIGIBLE). Enlisted enrollment code is "N" (NOT ELIGIBLE). PSD/NRA
- (20) Complete SDS Worksheet (enclosure (7)) for each recalled member. Forward SDS Worksheet, service record and all other required documents to servicing PSD for processing. NA/NRA
- (21) Annotate ultimate duty station and ultimate PSD on member's orders, PFR and service record per enclosure (3). PSD/PSD
- (22) Prepare a gain event (NP 1070/622) to report member PSD/PSD on active duty and NC 3068 9PAYPERSMAN 90427 & SDSROMAN B10210). PSD/PSD

Enclosure (2)

(23) Prepare skeleton record if member is not assigned PSD/PSD to shore duty in CONUS or Hawaii. Member will carry and turn in skeleton service record, health record, dental record and training record at ultimate duty station. Contents of the skeleton record are in enclosure (4).

(24). Forward service record and PFR to ultimate PSD/PSD PSD via fastest means per enclosure (3).

c. Echelon IV RTSS(TE) sites will enter MOB STAT "A" in RTSS(TE) for recalled members. This information will be retained in RTSS(TE) for informational purposes only and will not be passed to IMAPMIS.

d. NRA will:

(1) Annotate Drill Muster Record (NAVPERS 1570/12) indicating recall and duration and file copy of recall orders in personal drill folder. (Ref: BUPERSINST 1001.39).

(2) Re the focal point for all dependent inquiries/dependent support for recalled members (pay, dependent ID cards, etc.); and

(3) Liaison with PSD maintaining the member's PFR and service record as needed.

(4) DO NOT, REPEAT, DO NOT SUBMIT RSTARS LOSS ENTRY OR ANY OTHER ENTRY WHICH MAY IMPACT MGIB-R/BONUS ENTITLEMENTS.

Enclosure (2)

ULTIMATE PSD MAINTAINING PFR AND SERVICE RECORD (UPDATE #1)
(SELRES ONLY)

Member assigned to shore activity INCONUS and Hawaii:

maintained by PSD which normally supports ultimate duty station

Member assigned to USN/MSC ships and mobile units homeported
INCONUS:

maintained by the PSD at the homeport of the ship or mobile
unit

Member assigned to USN/MSC ships and mobile units homeported
OUTCONUS:

WESTPAC: maintained by PSD Pearl Harbor

EUROPE, MIDEAST: maintained by PSD NAVSTA Norfolk

Member assigned to shore activity OUTCONUS & Alaska

PACIFIC, ALASKA: maintained by PSD NAVSTA San Diego

EUROPE: maintained by PSD New London

MIDEAST: maintained by PSD NAVSTA Charleston

Enclosure (3)

SKELETON SERVICE RECORD (UPDATE #1)

Copies of the following documents will make up the skeleton service record:

Page 1070/602

Page 1070/604

Page 1070/613 (For adverse administrative remarks only)

Security Documents (OPNAV 5520/20 and DD 398)

Latest Evaluation

Enclosure (4)

ACTIVE DUTY ORDER SUPPLEMENTARY ITEMS (TO BE CONSIDERED AN INTEGRAL
PART OF YOUR BASIC ORDERS, NOT REQUIRED WITH COPIES)

1. Read these orders carefully before commencing travel. Contact the activity that issued the orders if you have any questions. Necessary corrections or modifications would be authorized by the order issuing authority before travel is begun.
2. Travel and report in appropriate uniform. You are required to have in your possession your Armed Forces Identification card (DD Form 2N-Reserve) and all government clothing previously issued when reporting to the order issuing activity for transportation to your ultimate destination.
3. You will be considered in a temporary active duty status during the time required for travel from your residence to the order issuing activity designated, and during the time required for physical examination. In complying with these orders you are authorized to travel at your own expense, subject to reimbursement in accordance with current instructions.
4. In the event you fail to qualify physically for active duty, you will be ordered home and released from temporary active duty.
5. Take NO action to move your dependents and household effects based on these orders until you have actually reported to a permanent duty station and movement is authorized in accordance with current directives.
6. In the event your reporting station is destroyed or you are otherwise unable to report as ordered, report to the nearest naval activity for instructions.
7. Bring with you to the order issuing activity copies or extracts from documents that will be required to update any changes to your status such as dependents information, marriage certificates, birth certificate of dependent children, insurance policies in force, or background information that would not already be contained in your service record.
8. (Any additional instructions required by the implementing directive and/or the order issuing activity.)

Enclosure (5)

ACTIVE DUTY ORDERS (INDIVIDUAL) - OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

1. AUTHORITY: CNO WASHINGTON DC 2 AUG 90 2. SERIAL NUMBER:

3. FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, (ACTIVITY NAME)

4. ACCOUNTING DATE(ENL): NBHO 1701453,2250 * 000022 AV BHO/1/9/5
BHO**

ACCOUNTING DATA (OFF): NSHO 1701453,2250 * 000022 AE SHO/1/1/T
SHO**

XECode for member paygrade **=Member's 9-digit SSN without dashes

5. TO: (Rate, Full Name, SSN)

6. By the authority indicated above you are hereby ordered to report for active military service for a period of 90 days unless released or extended for a lesser or greater period by competent authority. Report to the Medical Officer at the place and date indicated above for physical examination, including flight physical for aerouautically designated officers and aircrewmembers. If found physically qualified, or if no place of examination is designated, proceed in time to report to the activity listed in block 3 by (time), (date) for initial processing to active duty.

7. See reverse side or attached list of supplementary items for compliance.

8. After initial processing and when directed proceed and report not later than (time), (date) to: (Commanding Officer, (command to which ordered)).

Ultimate Destination or Intermediate point FFT Ultimate Destination. This paragraph applies for activation of units whose ultimate destination is other than the order issuing activity.

9. <u>COPY TO:</u>	10. <u>DATE PREPARED:</u>	11. <u>ISSUING OFFICER:</u>
COMNAVMIIPERSCOM (NMPC-313C), PCSVAD		(NAME)
COMNAVRESFOR (CODE 40), INTERMEDIATE DEST,		(RANK) (BRANCH)
NAVACCTFINCEN (CODE 411), ULTIMATE DEST		(TITLE)

12. ORDER MODIFICATIONS/COMPLIANCE/NON COMPLIANCE/EXEMPTION DATA

13. REPORTING ENDORSEMENTS

<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DATE AND HOUR</u>	<u>SIGNATURE</u>
RECEIVED ORDERS		
DEPARTED HOME		(RESERVIST)
REPORTED AND EXAMINED		
---PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED	ARRIVED	
---NOT PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED	DEPARTED	Medical Officer)
ARRIVED HOME		RESERVIST
DEPARTED HOME		RESERVIST

PROCEEDED

RESERVIST

REPORTED

Enclosure (5)

GUIDE FOR PREPARING ACTIVE DUTY ORDERS

GUIDANCE: This form order will serve as the template for Active Duty Orders (Individual) preparation. Note: There are variables you will have to customize such as blocks #2, #3, #4, #5/5a/5b/5c, 8 and 11.

When the DTG (block #1) is provided, enter the 2 digits after "DC" and before "2".

With respect to accounting data, the following codes are provided for entry in the "*" block to identify the individual's paygrade:

Enlisted Coding:

A=E1 B=E2 C=E3 D=E4 (< 2 YEARS SERVICE) E=E4 (> 2 YEARS SERVICE)
F=E5 G=E6 H=E7 J=E8 K=E9

Officer Coding:

L=W1 M=W2 N=W3 O=W4 Q=MIDN R=ENS A=LTJG T-LT
U-LCDR V-CDR W-CAPT X-RDML X-RDMU X-VADM X-ADM

Make sure you prepare only 1 line of accounting data--for enlisted or officer. You can save time by duplicating the order itself and selecting a name such as OFFCR. Then, delete the enlisted line of order; next, you can delete the officer accounting data from the remaining enlisted order.

When printing the order, you will need to do one test. This spacing is tight, so make sure you have your printer manually on "12-pitch" and the typed text begins VISUALL on the second line below the paper's perforation.

Enclosure (6)

SDS WORKSHEET (UPDATE #1)

SSN: _____ * NAME: _____ *

BR-CL (BRANCH/CLASS).....	_____	*
RATE-ABBR (RATE ABBREVIATION, I.E. ARFAN, PN3)....	_____	*
RPT-HOUR (REPORT HOUR).....	_____	*
RPT-DATE (REPORT DATE).....	_____	*
DET-DATE (DETACHMENT DATE FROM HOME).....	_____	*
UIC-ACTUAL.....	_____	*
SPI (SPECIAL PROGRAM INDICATOR TAR/TEMAC). (ENL ONLY) A	_____	*
UMI (UPWARD MOBILITY INDICATOR) (OFFICERS ONLY)... A	_____	*
CADD (CURRENT ACTIVE DUTY DATE).....	_____	*
RADO-MOS (RESERVE ACTIVE DUTY OBLIGATION - MONTHS.	_____	*
RADD-DAYS (RESERVE ACTIVE DUTY OBLIGATION-DAYS....	_____	*
VNI-INVOL-RECALL (VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY RECALL)....	_____	*
SDCD (STA DUTY COMMENCEMENT DATE).....	_____	*
SEX.....	_____	*
ACC (ACCOUNTING CATEGORY CODE).....	100	*
RES-CONT-EXT.....	_____	*
ENL-TERM (ENLISTMENT TERM).....	_____	*
CED (CURRENT ENLISTMENT DATE).....	_____	*
CITIZEN.....	_____	*
MBR-DOB (MEMBER'S DATE OF BIRTH).....	_____	*
MEMBER POB (MEMBER'S PLACE OF BIRTH).....	_____	*
PEBD (PAY ENTRY BASE DATE).....	_____	*
ADSD (ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE DATE).....	_____	*
ERFN (EXPIRATION OF RESERVE ENLISTMENT).....	_____	*
ULTIMATE UIC.....	_____	*
OPEX (OPERATIVE EXTENSION).....	_____	*
INOPEX (INOPERATIVE EXTENSION).....	_____	*
ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FROM.....	_____	*
ORDERS ISSUED BY.....	_____	*
AUTHORITY.....	_____	*
CERTIFY OFFICER NAME AND GRADE.....	_____	*
DOS (DEPENDENTS ON STATION CVERSEAS).....	_____	*
ENDORSEMENT NUMBER.....	01	*
DATE OF ORDERS.....	_____	*

*REQUIRED FIELDS

FOR PSDS EXCEPTION GAIN MESSAGE NOT REQUIRED FOR OFFICER PERSONNEL
FOR THIS RECALL.

Enclosure (7)

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS (UPDATE #1)

1. Availability of doctor during inoculations/drawing of blood.
2. Availability of correct serum for required inoculations.
3. Drain blood from personnel requiring HIV testing immediately upon reporting to obtain results as early as possible.
4. Verify health and dental records and make annotation indicating recall to active duty.
5. Updated Last Will and Testament.
6. Copies of birth certificates for member and all dependents.
7. Social Security Numbers for member and dependents.
8. Certified copies of marriage license or certificate and divorce decree.
9. Names and addresses of banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions, with account and safety deposit box numbers, as well as list of savings certificates and loans with each.

Enclosure (8)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baumgardner, CAPT Hugh, USNR, interview by LCDR Moore, 17 March 1991.
- Beck, Melinda, "Reveille for the Reserves," Newsweek, 3 September 1990.
- Binkin, Martin, U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior, The Brookings Institute, 1976.
- Bishop, Debbie, COMNAVRESFOR Code 4, Mobilization Analyst, interview by LCDR Moore, 13 May 1991.
- Brookes, CAPT Edward A., USN (ret), telephone interview by LCDR Moore, 15 February 1991.
- Brookes, CAPT Edward A., USN (ret), interviews by LCDR Moore, 17-20 May 1991.
- Bush, George, "United States Defenses: Reshaping our Forces," Vital Speeches, 1 September 1990, p. 676.
- Cronin, Patrick M., The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, June 1987.
- Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Manpower Research in the 1980s, Conference Proceedings, 30 June, 1 July 1982.
- Chaloupka, CDR Mel, USNR, Operation Desert Shield/Storm: Reconstruct of Naval Reserve Call-Up, United States Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Advanced Concepts Department, 3 April 1991.
- Cheney, Richard Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, Jan 1991.
- Commander, Naval Reserve Forces, Guide For the Mobilization of the Selected Reserve, COMNAVRESFOR P3060.1B.
- Cronin, P. M., The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, January 1987.
- Downey, Robert W., Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Participation in Operation Desert Shield (As of 15 January 1991), Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, January 1991.
- Dowd, Ann, "Workers Called to Arms," Fortune, 28 January 1991.
- Gilbert, Felix, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Gordon, Michael, "Cheney Says He Will Seek Longer Term for Reservists," New York Times, 10 January 1991, p. 7.
- Hall, John V., Final Report of the Total Force Utilization Study, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, July 1987.
- Howell, CDR Roger, USN, interview with LCDR Moore, 14 March 1991.

Kostiuk, Peter F., The Navy Manpower Requirements System, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, November 1988.

Lacy, James L., Naval Reserve Forces: The Historical Experience With Involuntary Recalls, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, April 1986.

Lacy, James L., "Whither the All-Volunteer Force?" Yale Law and Policy Review, (Fall 1986).

Leary, Guy B., An Analysis of the United States Naval Reserve Budget Growth, NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 6.

MacLeod, CAPT Charles, USNR, telephone interview by LCDR Moore, 13 February 1991.

MacLeod, CAPT Charles, USNR, interview by LCDR Moore, 17 March 1991.

Matt, CAPT Michael, OP-130R, interview by LCDR Moore, March 14, 1991.

Parke, CDR Tom, OP-095, interview by LCDR Moore, 13 May 1991.

Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Department of Defense, Fiscal 1986, 1988, 1989.

Rishel, Michael Paul, A Cost Comparison of Aviation Personnel: Active vs. Reserve, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Dec 1985.

Schmitt, Eric, "Standoff in the Gulf," New York Times, 15 December 1990, p. 9.

Shiells, Martha E., Pretrained Individual Manpower Resources and Requirements, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, July 1989.

Shiells, Martha E., Retention in the Naval Reserve Force, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, February 1988

✓ Shiells, Martha E. and Fletcher, Jean W., Summary of the Active/Reserve Force Mix Study, Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum, February 1987.

Simpson, Terry L. and Ingle, Brenda D., A Financial Management Review of the Naval Reserve Manpower Allowance and Training Requirements, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1987.

Skeen, David R., OP-16, "Resolution of Navy Personnel Information Deficiencies," (Briefing), 8 Feb 91.

Smith, RADM Francis, Speech at Naval Postgraduate School, 19 July 1989.

Steegman, David, "Future Cuts Would Reduce Capabilities Shown in Gulf," Navy Times, 4 March 1991, p. 22.

A Report on the Navy's Total Force FY 91, Department of the Navy, 1991.

Total Force Policy Report to Congress, Department of Defense, December 1990.

Warner, John T., and Goldberg, Matthew S., "The Influence of Non-Pecuniary Factors on Labor Supply: The Case of Navy Enlisted Personnel," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 66, 1984.


Wilson, B. J. III, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, United States Government Printing Office, May 1985,

Zuricher, Louis A., Supplementary Military Forces: Reserves, Militias, Auxiliaries, Sage, 1978.

Zuricher, Louis A., Boykin, Milton L., and Merritt, Hardy L., Citizen Sailors in a Changing Society: Policy Issues for Manning the United States Naval Reserve, Greenwood Press, 1986

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22304-6145	2
2. Library, Code 52 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5002	2
3. Dr. Richard S. Elster , Code AS/El Dean of Instruction Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
4. Dr. Mark Eitelberg, Code AS/Eb Department of Administrative Sciences Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
5. Chief of Naval Operations, Code 01R Navy Department Washington, D.C. 20360-5100	1
6. Chief of Naval Operations, Code 095 Navy Department Washington, D.C. 20360-5100	1
7. Chief of Naval Operations, Code 16 Navy Department Washington, D.C. 20360-5100	1
8. Chief of Naval Operations, Code 130R Navy Department Washington, D.C. 20360-5100	1
9. Commander, Naval Reserve Forces 4400 Dauphine St. New Orleans, LA 70117	2
10. Officer in Charge Bureau of Naval Personnel Det-NODAC, Building 150 Washington Navy Yard Anacostia Washington, D.C. 20374-1501	1
11. CAPT (ret) E. A. Brookes 5636 Pray Street Bonita, CA 91902	1
12. LCDR Daryce L. Moore 203 Yoakum Parkway Suite 1203 Alexandria, VA 22304	1





Zick Herbert L
ID:3276000183
M7615
Total Force : 4
Moore, Darce
due:10/8/1996, 2

Thesis
M7615 Moore
c.1 Total Force.

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY



3 2768 00018394 1